

Going Over Old Ground

How Security Sector Reform's Component Discourses Can
Help Bridge the Gap Between Theory and Practice

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September, 2008

Abstract

The 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste was a bloody awakening to the cracks that had begun to appear in the nation's security sector reform (SSR) programme. The withdrawal of pro-Indonesian militias in 1999 and unparalleled executive powers granted to the UN were widely thought to provide an environment conducive to the successful construction and reform of a security sector. Instead, the security sector institutions that the UN created were ill-conceived and brought the country to the brink of civil war. The failure of the UN to establish a viable security sector in Timor-Leste necessitates an investigation into why, despite laudable objectives, SSR is encountering difficulties when put into practice. This paper seeks to address two questions that are at the core of the divide between theory and practice: What is the exact nature of the 'security' at the heart of SSR? In what form can SSR enhance the developmental process? The answers to these questions are sought through a re-examination of the SSR paradigm. The deconstruction of SSR into its component discourses reveals three important areas of contextual knowledge: the developmental 'state of society', salient threats in the perceptions of individuals, and appreciation of the informal sector. Demonstrated through its application to the Timor-Leste case study, this framework provides a more subtle perspective of recipient countries. Crucially, the framework also generates context-specific answers to the questions posed above, and can ensure SSR is shaped to accommodate the challenges of the environment it encounters.

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Acronyms

CivPol:	United Nations Police (1999-2004)
CNRT:	The Council for National Resistance in Timor
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID:	The Department for International Development
DPKO:	The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
F-FDTL:	Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste
FALINTIL:	Pro-Independence Guerilla Force
FRAP:	Falintil Reintegration Assistance Programme
FONTIL:	Timor-Leste NGO Forum
FRETILIN:	Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente
ICG:	International Crisis Group
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
JPDA:	Joint Petroleum Development Area
NGO:	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD DAC:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
POLRI:	Police Force under Indonesian Occupation
PNTL:	Polilicia National de Timor-Leste
SSR:	Security Sector Reform
UN:	The United Nations
UNDP:	The United Nations Development Programme
UNPol:	United Nations Police (2004-present)
UNTAET:	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

Figure 1 - Map of Timor-Leste (Geographic Information Service, 2007)



Preface

In April and May of 2006 the streets of Timor-Leste's capital, Dili, were ravaged by violence resulting from a running battle that took place between the police and military. In reality, both had become little more than the personal militias of high-profile politicians and military leaders. Without the institutional history or knowledge to guide them, the security forces were manipulated by figureheads who undermined the state with their actions. The veneer of a functioning democracy was removed, and the shortcomings of institutions created by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) were exposed. The reputation of UNTAET, "touted as one of the organization's (sic) great success stories" (Hood, 2006: 60), lay in ruins.

Timor-Leste presented a unique and challenging environment for nationbuilding, which can in part explain the crisis in 2006. The history of colonization in Timor-Leste, and the differing degrees of interest shown by colonizing powers bears huge influence on the dynamics of contemporary society. The first Portuguese fort was constructed in 1566, for commercial and evangelical purposes (Durand, 2006: 50). However, until the end of the nineteenth century, the penetration of the colonialists into Timorese society remained minimal. The territory was largely administered from the confines of small settlements, and society retained its traditional form, with power in the hands of those who derived it from Timorese custom. It was only in 1912 that the Portuguese could claim direct rule, following a campaign of 20 years aimed towards this end. The Manufalu War, which signalled this watershed, claimed the lives of up to 5% of the population and marked the beginning of a series of similar incidents during the twentieth century which would deeply impact upon every aspect of society. Apart from a short but bloody Japanese occupation during World War Two, the country was under Portuguese rule until 1975, when East Timor declared its independence after a brief civil war. Shortly afterwards Indonesian Generals decided to invade, to prevent the establishment of a communist state on their doorstep.

In its early years the Indonesian occupation was extensive and brutal. A number of massacres took place, the most famous caught on film at the Santa Cruz Cemetery and shown to the world. During the first five years of occupation no less than 250,000 Timorese perished. Indonesian sources have admitted at least 120,000 people were killed by the army (17% of the population and a very conservative figure), and 70,000 more died of starvation in Indonesian run camps. The situation in

these camps was so dire that the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time compared the situation to Biafra (*Ibid*: 86-97). Although the occupation became less extreme as attempts were made to ‘normalise’ the situation, massacres were reported throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The situation in East Timor between 1975 and 1997 was largely ignored by the international community for fear of upsetting Indonesia, a key military and economic power in the region. Only in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which weakened Indonesia and led to the fall of President Suharto, did industrialised countries speak out and begin to focus on finding a solution (*Ibid*: 166).

Under both Portuguese and Indonesian rule, the East Timorese were largely excluded from any high-level administrative roles; the economy was monopolised by foreigners and almost no development took place. Furthermore, the weeks either side of the Popular Consultation¹ in 1999 were marred by violence perpetrated by Indonesian militias. The trail of destruction left three-quarters of all administrative buildings destroyed and a population traumatised by what they had witnessed (*Ibid*: 120). UN entry in 1999 met with the unique situation of a newly established state lacking any significant physical or administrative infrastructure. Consequently, for the first time in its history, the UN (UNTAET) assumed total executive, legislative and judicial authority to construct institutions of state and rule the country until it was fit for independence. This unparalleled freedom also meant extra responsibilities and, notwithstanding the shortage of local capacity, it was the UN’s record that came under the closest scrutiny during investigations to explain the violence of 2006.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme has been subjected to the greatest examination due to the institutions at the heart of the crisis. SSR is a relatively modern concept that brings a wide range of actors under the security sector umbrella and champions democratic structures and principles. It is seen as a refreshing approach to combating a dysfunctional security sector acting as the primary obstacle to peace operations (Rees, 2006). However, the relative youth of SSR means that broad endorsement of the discipline has not been supported by contextual success stories. Termed the “conceptual-contextual divide” (Chanaa, 2002: 61), efforts in Kosovo, Liberia and elsewhere have failed to truly reform the security sector into a democratically controlled and principled functioning organism (Rees, 2006).

As a result, very few trustworthy guidelines are available to support the implementation of SSR theory in practical environments. This paper aims to help bridge the gap; it proposes to examine the

¹ This was the name given to the referendum the Timorese were granted, giving them the choice of either independence or autonomy within the Indonesian state. 98% of the population voted, and 78.5% of these voted in favour of independence (Durand, 2006).

theoretical underpinnings of unsuccessful elements of SSR in Timor-Leste, in order to identify disconnects between theory and practice. Central questions remain unanswered regarding the definition of the ‘security’ that SSR seeks to deliver, and the optimum means through which the discipline can enhance specific developmental processes. The search for answers must start with a greater understanding of SSR’s constituent discourses. They contain lessons that will engender a more nuanced approach to the way in which recipient countries are perceived and their contextual peculiarities analysed. The findings of this paper are presented in the form of a framework, in order to better shape reform efforts and identify theory that can feasibly be implemented in a particular situation. If SSR can be tailored to the environment in which it is carried out, instead of encouraging generic solutions, it is likely to have a greater chance of success.

Chapter 1 introduces Timor-Leste as a case study, focussing on distinctive traits of the population and society; Chapter 2 moves on to frame the SSR effort in Timor-Leste within the context of relevant theory, highlighting any habitual failings of SSR and assessing the impact of such a unique environment. The study then proceeds to an examination of the individual theoretical components behind SSR in Chapter 3, deriving lessons for better practice and assessing their implications for the discipline. Finally, using the lessons learnt, Chapter 4 outlines a practical framework that SSR professionals could use to analyse their environment; the new and detailed picture the framework could paint is highlighted through the fresh perspective it brings to the Timor-Leste case-study.

Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to Alpaslan Özerdem, my supervisor in York, whose direction and advice was invaluable throughout the production of this paper. Gratitude must also be extended to the staff at the PRDU who contributed to this piece of work. Adrian Leftwich for the constant supply of literature on any topic I requested, and Sultan Barakat whose guidance was a great help. Credit goes to Roger MacGinty and all the inspirational lecturers that contributed to the course, who provided the conceptual tools with which this piece of work was carried out. Sally Carter also merits a special mention for her tireless administrative effort and support, without which students of the PRDU would be lost.

A heartfelt thanks to all those in Timor-Leste who took an interest in the research I carried out and befriended me during my stay. In particular Murray McCullough, whose energy, good humour and tireless dedication to providing research opportunities made my time fruitful and thoroughly enjoyable. Michael Page also deserves praise for putting up with me in his office for two months and patiently engaging in conversation on SSR, and a considerable range of other topics. To all the members of the SSSU, my sincerest gratitude for making me so welcome and helping me in any way you could.

My appreciation also goes to family and friends who have been so supportive during the writing-up of this paper. In particular, I must thank my Mum, Dad, and Helena, who all took the time to read earlier drafts of the manuscript, and provided constructive comments.

Finally, I acknowledge my classmates. The past year has been rich in experiences and laughter, and I am thankful that I can call you all friends.

Author's Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of York. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Chapter 1: A Snapshot of Timor-Leste

"Timor is a particularly interesting subject of study that mirrors all the tensions of modern history, from colonization (sic) to cold war as well as contemporary issues: the rights of people, the dysfunction of the international community as well as "sustainable development" (Durand, 2006: 15).

The literature on SSR places increasing importance on the context in which reform is carried out (Hendrickson, 1999; Chanaa, 2002). The conditions into which international aid workers enter should dictate to some extent the strategies they employ and the priorities that are identified. Therefore, it is reasonable to begin this paper by examining Timor-Leste as a society and a state. This will be carried out initially via a close look at the characteristics of the population and East Timorese society, before moving on to the current political and economic realities. The aim of the chapter will be to provide a backdrop to SSR efforts in Timor-Leste, allowing for a more informed evaluation of the reform process itself.

Physical Characteristics


The physical landscape has a major impact of the lives of most Timorese, often dictating the standards of living for a particular year through weather conditions and the fertility of the soil. Similarly, the deficiency in man-made infrastructure is a crucial bottleneck for entrepreneurial citizens to expand their activities, and a major contributor to Timor-Leste's poor life expectancy and infant mortality indicators. One feature of the landscape which will be absent from this short subsection is oil, as it impacts very little on the population in its current undeveloped state; instead, it will be addressed elsewhere.

The Physical Landscape of Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste is among the smallest nations when considered in terms of size and population. Its surface area of around 14,610 km² (Durand, 2006: 16) is comparable with Fiji, and the population of approximately 1,108,777 million people (CIA, 2008) is slightly larger than that of Cyprus. However,


there are natural phenomena which can render the country a less than hospitable place to live and work. One such example is the omnipresent vulnerability to both drought and flooding, directly influencing the levels of food available for consumption. Generally the east receives the majority of rainfall, while the west remains drier (Durand, 2006), but the tendency of these two phenomena to occur in extremes is problematic for the food security of these regions.

Figure 2 - Areas of Flood Risk and Food Insecurity (United Nations, 2008)



Annual problems with the aforementioned conditions has led to the designation of a 'lean season' between November and March during which food insecurity rises and the propensity for conflict increases:

Figure 3 - Harvests and Patterns of Food Insecurity (UNDP, 2002: 16)



Note: The bars indicate the percentage of sucos reporting insufficient food in that month. The areas indicate the percentage of sucos reporting a maize or rice harvest in that month.

Overall, around 64% of the population suffer from food insecurity (UNDP, 2006: 2). This situation is accentuated by the inhospitable nature of some of the land in Timor-Leste. The soils are non-volcanic and not especially fertile, while studies have shown that 44% of the country has a slope of approximately 40% with a thin top layer of soil that is easily washed away (UNDP, 2002: 19). With the lack of a land registration system to provide security and encourage investment in modern technologies, the weather and soil are major contributors to poverty.

Physical Infrastructure

The lack of functioning and effective physical infrastructure compounds the poor quality of life for many East Timorese. 50% of the population don't have acceptable access to safe drinking water, while 60% have no adequate sanitation (UNDP, 2006: 1). The road network, vital for access to education and health services as well as the economy, is incomplete and leaves some areas of the country isolated. Principal roads are for the most part passable and allow travel, however secondary and feeder roads are less reliable. With 1,200km of main road, 2,000km of secondary and 1,800km

of feeder roads, a large percentage of the road network is dysfunctional; around 20% of sucos (villages) in the country are connected by dirt roads which often become impassable during the rainy season (Ibid: 29). The expense involved in travel and limited electricity supplies for rural areas (10% have access) mean communications facilities for those outside of the towns are limited (Ibid: 19); this lack of a reliable supply of information has been credited as a root of unrest amongst some areas of society (USAID, 2006).

East Timorese Society

Taking the physical characteristics of Timor-Leste into account, it is the qualities of the population itself, the organisational structures in society and the capacities a society possesses which truly define the way of life enjoyed by the majority. Furthermore, society has a formative and inescapable influence on both the political and economic spheres of a state, and dictates developmental prospects in these two areas. There are a number of indicators² that are invoked when assessing societies and the platform they provide for development. As important as these are, they must be supplemented by a thorough knowledge of the ways in which communities operate and the lines of fracture that could potentially hinder any developmental process. This section will thus address East Timorese society on three levels: the features of the population at an individual level, the structures that sustain and bind communities together, and the nature of civil society in Timor-Leste. This will provide a comprehensive picture of the foundations around which national and international institutions have to base planning and policy initiatives.

Features of the Population at an Individual Level


The first major feature of Timor-Leste's population is its youth; 34% of the population are aged between 12 and 29 years old, with this figure expected to rise to 37% by 2010 (UNDP, 2006: 7). This has triggered what the World Bank has termed a youth "in crisis", as many don't finish school, are unemployed and feel dislocated from society (2007: 73). Although incidence of unemployment is highest in major urban centres³ and 76% of people are found in rural areas, the population as a whole is affected, as it is growing by 3% annually and many of the rural poor are choosing to migrate to urban centres in search of better wages (UNDP, 2002: 13). Poverty is a chronic affliction for the East Timorese, with over 40% of the population living on less than the national poverty line of \$0.55 per day (UNDP, 2006: 11).

² E.g. Human Development Index, Peace Index, Business Environment Index etc

³ Dili and Baucau

There is widespread poverty beyond the economic sphere; the health of the nation is also one of the poorest in Asia. Life expectancy in 2004 was 55.5 years (UNDP, 2006: 1) and preventable diseases, such as diarrhoea, malaria and respiratory infections, have a significant influence on this figure. There is a severe shortage of doctors, with the World Bank counting 17 native doctors compared to 300 Cuban doctors situated around the country (2007: 37). Access to healthcare is also compromised as a result of the state of the road system and the cost of transport combining to deter the poorest sectors of society from visiting clinics in all but the most serious cases (UNDP, 2006: 11). The state of the health system was not helped by the post-consultation violence in 1999 when 80% of clinics were destroyed. The violence also affected a similar number of schools; however, the deficiency in facilities should not mask other inadequacies of the education many young Timorese receive. Although there are no direct costs of schooling, poverty once more hinders access through indirect costs such as transport, clothing and books (UNDP, 2002: 5). This leaves between 10% and 30% of primary school aged children unenrolled in the system and relatively low levels of literacy (UNDP, 2006: 1).

Figure 4 - Adult Literacy, 2001 (UNDP, 2002: 47)



An added drawback is that many teachers have not completed an adequate level of schooling themselves and are poorly prepared to carry out their jobs (World Bank, 2007). The poor system of education, and a lack of access to it, results in a significant portion of the population alienated from reasonable waged labour through their shortage of transferable skills.

Due to Timor-Leste's history of occupation, the current inhabitants have experienced Portuguese, Indonesian and Independence schooling. Consequently, many different languages are spoken, posing a problem for the authorities; official languages are Portuguese and Tetun, leaving elements of the population alienated from some parliamentary and judicial proceedings. The history of occupation has also left an intangible psychological legacy for the Timorese. The trauma of arbitrary detentions, shootings, famines is bound to have impacted upon modern society (Durand, 2006). In addition to the horrors of previous colonial occupations, the more modern phenomena of displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is also having a disruptive effect on certain elements of Timorese society, which will be dealt with later in this chapter.

The low levels of health and education, severe economic poverty, and the traumas suffered whilst living under occupation all contribute in some way to the split between people residing in the east of the country and those hailing from the west. It is unclear whether this cleavage is a creation of manipulative politicians creating personal spheres of influence, or a more profound fracture in society that has been hidden by the unity required to resist foreign occupation (United Nations, 2006). Whatever the roots of the division, the events of 2006 and subsequent outbreaks of violence illustrate that East Timorese national identity is not as strong as was once imagined and people feel vulnerable. As a result growing numbers have a suspicion of the 'Other' which is heightening the importance of regional allegiances.

Structures that sustain and bind communities together

Throughout occupations and upheavals East Timorese society has retained fundamental characteristics that have been crucial in ensuring the survival and unique identity of the East Timorese people. Society was left relatively untouched during much of the Portuguese rule, as their interest centred mainly on trade around Dili. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that colonial systems of government expanded to cover the majority of the country. However, the Portuguese did not challenge local traditions and ceremonies and traditional political leaders suffered "no loss of power" (Hohe, 2002: 575). Indonesian administrators showed less regard for tradition and introduced a democratic electoral system for the position of village chief. Nevertheless traditional authorities were central in the candidate selection process and lost very little influence in real terms, remaining crucial to the running of society. (Ibid: 576).

It would be wrong to think of traditional customs and institutions as static or a single entity; they are in fact ever changing and adapting to new situations, and as a result often differ from village to village (Mearns, 2001). There are some features that are constant across the many traditions in

Timor-Leste. Most take kinship as the foundation of their social structures. ‘Houses’ are created through marriage and membership is determined by blood. These kinship groups are also represented physically in the form of a ‘sacred house’ or *uma lulik* (Appendix G); an expression of socio-cosmic ideas in which heirlooms and significant objects of ancestors are placed and serve as a link to the past (Ibid: 571). Marriage also ensures the survival and honour of the ‘house’, through expansion of blood-kinship ties. The act of marriage is one of the most sacred in Timorese culture as it represents a union of fertility on the part of the female and security through the male, two vital components of survival. An asymmetrical relationship exists between the families of the wife-giver and wife-taker; often regarded as a bride price, there is an exchange of gifts that heavily favours the family of the wife-giver, as the female is recognised as the “ultimate source of life” (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 13). Once two families have entered into a wife-giver/wife-taker relationship the roles cannot be reversed. This serves to clearly define the social relationships between individuals in society as well as ensuring alliances with other ‘houses’, which widens the kinship circle and provides security in numbers.

A further aspect of East Timorese tradition sees a strict separation of the ritual and political realms. Each *uma lulik* is headed by an elder, who has responsibility for communication with, and representation of, the ancestors. The elder of the ‘house’ that has resided on the land for the greatest period has responsibility for all the ‘houses’ in the vicinity. There are a series of ritual authorities across the community that account for sacred items and ceremonial life, and which represent fertility. Ritual figures are traditionally silent and strictly confined to the spiritual sphere, only delving into the contrasting political authorities to select political leaders or *liurai* from the correct royal ‘house’ (Ibid: 14). If the wrong selection is made it is believed the community will be punished by the ancestors. In most contexts, political figures are inferior to their ritual counterparts, receiving direction from ancestors through these bodies. Nevertheless, the *liurai* plays an important role communicating with the ‘outside’, carrying out negotiations in territorial disputes and ensuring the safety of the community.

The East Timorese community is dependent upon a strict hierarchy being observed and respect for elders, who are seen as the holders of customary law. Legitimacy is obtained through proximity with ancestors and their traditions; ancestors are said to provide for all the kinship group’s needs in return for adherence to their order (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 17). The local system of justice that enforces participation in the ancestral order is derived from two principal sources: ancient rituals and myths, and more recent historical narratives recited by customary elders or *lian nain*, which provide precedents for proper behaviour (Zifcak, 2004: 46-47). Shaped by occupational regimes and

systems of law, local tribunals are increasingly made up of political leaders⁴, but practices remain based on the interpretation of ritual authorities and the two realms act in concert (*Ibid*). Any wrongdoing disturbs the order and values of the ancestors, and the system of justice seeks to restore balance through reciprocity and exchange. This is normally achieved through a negotiated settlement between the tribunal and accused parties, aimed at extracting a frank admission of guilt and appropriate compensation in order that society can return to roughly the point it was at before the crime was committed. The successful settlement of a dispute in accordance with spiritual specifications is a necessity for the harmony of the wider community and also the restoration of a balance between the cosmos and secular worlds (*Ibid*: 48).

Traditions in Timor-Leste are patriarchal by nature, which has caused much concern among international aid workers. The subjugation of women is perhaps best illustrated by the treatment of rape by traditional authorities. If the woman in question is unmarried then it is generally accepted that she will marry the accused; if the accused refuses or is already married a compensation price is arranged. Rather than the individual being punished for the severity of his crime, the punishment seeks to return order to the world of social relationships (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 19). The female will emerge from the ordeal as ‘damaged’ and the family must be compensated for their loss. The indicators on gender suggest that women are indeed discriminated against by society in general; girls are more likely to drop out of school than boys and in 2006 two thirds of women were illiterate compared to less than half of men. There are also cases of domestic violence that come to the attention of the authorities, and countless more which remain within the familial unit (UNDP, 2006: 2).

Remnants of the internal clandestine resistance structures also remain and played an important role in the transition to independence. During the Indonesian occupation the resistance movement implemented an extensive organisational structure that stretched across the country and worked with ritual authorities in selecting people with traditional authority to important positions (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 31). In the period following the Popular Consultation, the Council for National Resistance in Timor (CNRT) re-established clandestine structures which operated in parallel to the UN administration. Many UN employees were not trusted and depended heavily on CNRT structures to administer the population at a local level (Hohe, 2002). Although the CNRT has since become a

⁴ The heads of villages, *Chefe de Suco* and *Chefe d’aldeia*.

political party, successive governments of Timor-Leste have introduced limited reform of local governance structures, suggesting clandestine networks might still play a significant role.⁵

Civil Society in Timor-Leste

The scope of civil society in Timor-Leste is relatively limited as it is a young nation that has not previously been afforded complete freedom of association and speech. The Catholic Church is the most influential element of civil society. Introduced by the Portuguese, the Church was mainly concentrated in urban centres until the onset of the Indonesian occupation when it was propagated around the country in response to the perceived atheism of the population and the strong communist associations this was believed to have (Mearns, 2001: 11). The outreach into rural areas has provided a nationwide sphere of influence, proof of which can be found in the role the Church played during the resistance. The role of the clergy in raising awareness of Timor-Leste's plight was crucial, most famously exemplified by the Nobel Peace Laureate Bishop Belo. The clergy was also used to conduct the flow of information in and out of the country (*Ibid*, 12). Although still secondary in importance to traditional structures, the leverage gained through its role in the resistance allows the Church an active role in building dialogue and mediating conflict (USAID, 2004: 5).

Since 1999 there has also been an explosion in the number of local and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in Timor-Leste in a variety of different capacities; more than 400 are registered with FONTIL, the Timor-Leste NGO Forum (UNDP, 2006: 5). The sector is not without its critics. These focus mainly on the wages NGOs offer, which dwarf those paid by the Government and attract many of the skilled workers from a very shallow pool. The effectiveness of the multitude of organisations in operation is also questioned as there is little consensus between them and considerable inexperience, resulting in minimal oversight of government activities (World Bank, 2007).

Finally, although allegedly comprising of a large criminal element, youth groups and martial arts gangs are a highly influential component of civil society. There are several different and varied incarnations of such groups⁶, however for our purposes it is worth concentrating on three: Large disaffected groups with grievances from the past, martial arts groups, and youth groups. There are sections of the population whose common grievances form into pressure groups, including the rural unemployed, poor farmers and ex-Falintil fighters (Scambary, 2006). These groups sometimes

⁵ The Local Government Support Programme (LGSP) was set up in 2007 to aid the 4th Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste to reform local governance structures.

⁶ An AUSAID report (2006) identifies seven main categories, with three subcategories.

incorporate a religious element and the influence they can have is summed up by the role of veterans' groups in heightening tensions during the 2006 crisis (United Nations, 2006). Unofficially estimated at having over ninety thousand members, martial arts gangs are increasingly wielding a significant influence on Timorese society and politics. Several, such as 'Seven 7', have members in all thirteen districts and although they claim to teach the principles of self-discipline and non-violence, there is strong evidence of close links with smuggling and protection rackets (Scambary, 2006). Youth groups have a more positive impact on society. They involve a range of ages and genders, and organise sporting activities, perform social services by cleaning streets and helping the poor, and conduct some informal courses (*Ibid*). If one examines Timor-Leste through the lens of Paul Collier's 'Greed Theory' (2000), a feasible explanation of the strength of such groups emerges. He proposes that most conflicts, and their associated violence, are motivated by economics, and a combustible situation ensues when a population contains a high proportion of young men, education levels are low, and the country is heavily reliant on primary exports (Collier, 2000: 93-94). The high proportion of young males and low levels of education in Timor-Leste could explain the illegal and violent activities of many groups.

The Politics and Major Political Actors in Timor-Leste

The political scene in Timor-Leste mirrors the youth of the independent nation itself, with structures and customs loosely embedded in the culture. Although constitutionally a fully-fledged democracy, the high rates of illiteracy and widespread incidence of violence associated with elections (Appendix D) indicate the underdevelopment of society renders a different political reality. Nevertheless, these malfunctioning political institutions and major political players will eventually be key components in ensuring democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector. On a more general level they will also be tasked with providing an environment that promotes human and economic development, and therefore deserve to be acknowledged.

Political Structures

Timor-Leste is constitutionally a "semi-presidential" democracy; power is split between the president, who has right to veto and dismiss parliament, and the legislature, from which a prime minister is chosen. He appoints the Council of Ministers, which holds most of the executive power (UNDP, 2002: 34). The Parliament is currently made up of sixty five members selected from party lists according to proportional representation; the largest parties are FRETILIN, a communist party set up on independence in 1974 that returned from exile in 1999 embracing capitalism, and the

CNRT, established by former resistance leader Xanana Gusmao (CIA, 2008). Power is administered through 13 districts, 67 sub-districts, 498 sucos and 2,336 aldeias (UNDP, 2002: 12), however elections are only carried out down to suco level and much power is still concentrated centrally (UNDP, 2006). The civil service is limited to just over 17,000 permanent staff, with the organisation as a whole numbering 25,631 including teachers; these low numbers, coupled with very little capacity remaining from the Indonesian occupation, contribute to the inadequate provision of public services (World Bank, 2007: 56).

Limited decentralisation of power and civil service inadequacies mean the state is most keenly felt in Dili and has much less bearing on those living in rural areas. Even in Dili inexperience and a lack of expertise inhibits the legislature from providing sufficient oversight of executive figures (*Ibid*, 27). The dislocation of the state from inhabitants under its jurisdiction is compounded by many institutions lacking designated spokespeople and mechanisms for sharing information of their activities (*Ibid*, 12). The system of courts detailed in the Constitution is also not in existence, with the Supreme Court the most notable omission. Two levels of courts do exist: the District courts (Dili, Baucau, Suai and Oecussi) and the Court of Appeal, which also serves as the Supreme Court (United Nations, 2006). The failure to provide widespread access to formal justice leads many East Timorese to rely on customary justice mechanisms (Hohe, 2003).

Political Actors

Timor-Leste's political arena is described as "in-bred" (USAID, 2006: 8) due to a small Timorese elite, which is laced with factionalism and rivalries dating back to independence clashes and disagreements during the resistance period. The first historical incident with a bearing on today's politics was the civil war in 1975. Fought between the independence-seeking FRETILIN, and the integrationist UDT, the war left as many as 3,000 dead and many more displaced (Durand, 2006: 70). FRETILIN emerged victorious, sparking Indonesian concerns over a communist state on their doorstep, and ensuring that most major political actors until the present day emerged from this group (International Crisis Group, 2006^a). It was also from FRETILIN that the military wing of the resistance, Falintil, was born; initially retaining its political affiliations, Falintil's Commander, Xanana Gusmao, renounced politics in setting up the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1988. This removed military operations from the influence of FRETILIN leaders in exile and created the second major schism in Timorese politics. The solidification of this cleavage came in 2006 when the umbrella organisation now named CNRT reconfigured as a political party, pitting Xanana Gusmao and supporters in direct electoral competition with FRETILIN for parliamentary seats. The factions

described above played a notable role in the 2006 crisis, accounting for tensions between the then president, Xanana Gusmao, and the FRETILIN Government led by Mari Alkateri. They were also pivotal to the broad alignment of key army (F-FDTL) commanders with their resistance leader, Gusmao, and politicisation of the police by FRETILIN Minister of Interior, Rogerio Lobato, to guard against the perceived power of the President. These tensions that contributed to the security forces turning on one another are ongoing, and are likely to have a significant influence on the future of East Timorese politics.

The Economic Terrain

The economy of Timor-Leste is directly influenced by society and politics, both of which are currently undermining efforts to improve agriculture and industry. The World Bank states, “Private investment is minimal with insecurity compounding one of the most unattractive business environments in the world” (2007: 2). The country is ranked 174 out of 175 nations surveyed for ease of doing business, with high input costs, cumbersome administration and an inadequate judicial system (*Ibid*, 4). The continued displacement of over 100,000 people as a consequence of the 2006 crisis heightens insecurity. As many as 30,000 of the IDPs live in camps in Dili, which have become havens for martial arts gangs looking to recruit and carry out illegal activities. The camps are also attracting young, impoverished males from rural areas that come in search of work and new experiences, encouraging an unorganised, crowded and unhealthy form of urbanisation (International Crisis Group, 2008^b; Appendix G)).

Insecurity is embellished by deficiencies in land law and the prosecution of violent criminals (the legal and judicial sectors are expanded upon in Chapters 2 & 4). Punishment of those that carry out violence and intimidation in rural areas and cause displacement is rare, as the judicial system is underdeveloped and overburdened. This sends out a message that the perpetrators will seldom be penalised for their actions and encourages repeat offending (*Ibid*). However, the key factor behind much of the conflict, displacement and economic stagnation in Timor-Leste today is the lack of uniform system of land registration and territorial dispute mediation. Most title deeds were destroyed in the violence of 1999 or never existed. Those that did exist were a mixture of customary entitlements, Portuguese land law and the Indonesian land regime, with many overlaps and contradictions between the three (International Crisis Group, 2008^b). Revised Land Laws were drafted in 2005, yet opposing claims to land are so difficult to mediate and the issue so controversial that no government has taken on the challenge (World Bank, 2007). Without political resolution of the problem there will be no end to the conflict and displacement afflicting the economic

environment. Farmers' reluctance to use land, over which they have no concrete claim, as collateral means the agricultural sector remains enveloped in a cycle of subsistence.

Agriculture

Around three-quarters of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but productivity is low as landholdings are small⁷ and cost of transport is high, resulting in many basic foodstuffs being imported from abroad (UNDP, 2006: 15). There is a lack of the skills and capital required to utilise higher levels of technology, with around 3% of households using external inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers (*Ibid*: 28). Coffee provides the greatest source of income⁸, generating funds for around a quarter of households, but these exports are minimal and are dwarfed by the imports required to feed the population, which account for a trade deficit running at a third of GDP in 2006 (*Ibid*: 27).

Industry

The private sector in Timor-Leste is small, accounting for little over 3.5% of GDP in 2000 (UNDP, 2002: 7). In addition to the unfavourable business conditions listed above, there is a shortage of credit available, especially for the rural poor, inhibiting entrepreneurialism. Consequently, 80% of the business community is made up of family firms, which have small turnovers and employ few people. There are currently 40,000 workers in the private sector as a whole and 16,000 entering the market every year resulting in many unskilled and unemployed youths (World Bank, 2007: 49). The presence of large numbers of international workers also creates an unsustainable market for firms involved in production of furniture and construction. The importance of this sector was illustrated by the shrinking economy during UN downsizing between 2004 and 2006 (UNDP, 2006). It therefore seems inevitable in the short-term that government expenditure will be the most stable vehicle for growth, especially considering Timor-Leste's significant natural endowments.

Natural Resources

The petroleum and natural gas possessed by Timor-Leste could prove either a blessing or a curse. The resources are located under the Timor Sea between Timor-Leste and Australia, and the proceeds from extraction and refinement will be shared according to a series of bilateral agreements. The most significant of these concern the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA),

⁷ The poorest half of the population have average land holdings of 0.22 hectares, while only 5% of households have access to 1 hectare or more (UNDP, 2006: 15)

⁸ Satisfying Collier's third criterion for internal violent conflict (a reliance on primary exports).

which will be divided 90%-10% in favour of the Timorese, and the Greater Sunrise gas field, the proceeds from which will be split in half (World Bank, 2007: 39). The projections for the proceeds of the Greater Sunrise field have not been completed, but the JPDA alone is estimated to earn Timor-Leste \$7 billion between 2004 and 2024 (UNDP, 2002: 8; Appendix E).

It will be the job of political and economic elites to ensure Timor-Leste does not fall into the ‘resource curse’, whereby the government becomes over-reliant on the revenues from a natural resource, leaving it unaccountable to the population and encouraging corruption. To avoid such a scenario, the Petroleum Fund Law guarantees most of the proceeds from petroleum are put into a fund. Only a reasonable amount, calculated by an “estimated sustainable income” formula, is released for government expenditure (World Bank, 2007: 39). If the state is able to solve the problem of weak capacity translating into poor budget execution, this could provide a sustainable source of growth over the medium-term.

External Issues

The absence of a serious external threat to Timor-Leste is extremely positive for the nation. Despite a disturbing and bloody shared history with Indonesia, contemporary relations are generally cordial although some concerns are still raised over accountability for human rights abuses committed during the occupation (International Crisis Group, 2006^b). The only area bordering foreign land is with Indonesia to the west of the country and is largely peaceful. Incidents are rare but some tension remains over the presence of pro-Indonesian East Timorese militia men across the border in West Timor and widespread smuggling. Former militias are not politically united and lack the backing of the Indonesian military and police which could render them a threat (*Ibid*). Smuggling is proving a more complex problem, particularly as it provides a vital livelihood for many border communities and is an important element in sustaining the dislocated territory of Oecusse. However, the porous border is far from a national security threat and external influences on East Timorese society are largely benign.

Conclusion

Timor-Leste is a young state and this is reflected in the factional nature of its politics and underdeveloped economy. Of far more importance when assessing the country is its population and the structures associated with it. In terms of human development, Timor-Leste has unsatisfactory indicators, showing inadequate provision of schooling and healthcare. This is compounded by

widespread youth unemployment and associated economic poverty, both of which are proving significant contributors to ongoing unrest and outbreaks of serious violence. The frustrations of the population are enhanced by difficult conditions for agriculture that see up to 64% of the population go hungry at some point in the year (UNDP, 2006: 2). The prospect of violence and hunger is dealt with largely by traditional East Timorese community structures that have survived three occupations and helped a traumatised population to maintain a distinctive identity. These structures are based around the kinship group and socio-cosmic ideas of ancestors regulating everyday life. They serve to promote security through large familial groups and resolve low-level disputes. Although sometimes dismissive towards women, local structures play a significant role in ordinary rural citizens' lives, in many cases outweighing the state in importance.

The poorly educated, kinship orientated nature of East Timorese society shapes both the political and economic spheres. The country is officially a democracy but violence is strongly associated with elections and oversight of executive actors is weak. The small pool of skilled resources results in the bureaucracy lacking capacity and numbers, and means many core public services fail to function. Furthermore, a small cadre of political elites wield most of the power within the state, and longstanding grievances have in the past caused political processes to be subverted in pursuit of individual interests. The economy is also burdened by the limitations of society; the population is largely engaged in subsistence agriculture, with possibility of entrepreneurial ventures restricted by violence, high costs and a lack of official entitlement to land. The small manufacturing sector that does exist is mainly composed of small family firms and dependent on the market provided by international aid workers.

Timor-Leste is a developing nation and much must change before structures identifiable to those from the West begin to function as they should. The comprehensive development of society, provision of public services and the delicate handling of tradition will be central to these ends. The pursuit of these goals will hopefully be aided by the careful management and harvesting of lucrative natural resources, which, if utilised sensibly, could place Timor-Leste in a strong position to move forward.

Chapter 2: Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste

"A systematic, comprehensive approach [to SSR]...should be based on a realistic analysis of actual security and law-enforcement needs. Unless there is non-partisan commitment to the reform process, structural problems are likely to remain unresolved and the security forces politicised and volatile" (International Crisis Group, 2008^a: i).

The unique set of circumstances under which SSR was carried out in Timor-Leste renders analysis essential in order to learn lessons from the new pitfalls that were encountered. Additionally, by detailing the practical implementation of SSR within the context of relevant theory, this chapter identifies significant areas in which the application of theory was not possible or became subverted. The contrast between the optimum ends of SSR outlined in theory and the results produced in Timor-Leste will provide impetus for the reconstitution of practical guidelines that will take place in Chapters 3 & 4.

Origins of SSR

SSR was conceived by the British Department for International Development (DFID) during the late 1990s in response to concern that developing countries' security forces were often negatively influencing development. It was observed that the military, in particular, could consume scarce resources and this problem was often part of a broader set of social, economic and political challenges. The security sector's relevance to the wider developmental process led to an acknowledgement that a more holistic approach to development would have to be employed, incorporating security concerns and the institutions set up to counter them (Hendrickson, 1999: 9). The incorporation of security into development thinking was symptomatic of the changing nature of the international landscape following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the Cold War, security issues were seen as too 'political' for bilateral donor agencies or International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to be involved, and consequently a separation of security and development was found at both academic and policy levels. From 1990 the emergence of a consensus on what

constituted ‘Good Governance’⁹ allowed agencies to address and pass comment on security issues without compromising their neutrality (Luckham, 2005).


Throughout the 1990s the international development community shifted towards more interventionist policies, eschewing previous practices of simply funding their own initiatives and influencing policy through structural adjustment. As a consequence international donor agencies became more accountable for the failure of projects in recipient countries. Previous experience confirmed that simply adopting democratic processes was not sufficient to ensure that democracy took root. A democratic façade often masked continuing military control built around priorities that did not have the protection of civilians from violence at their core. These states constituted what Fareed Zakaria termed “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria in Hendrickson, 1999: 27). In response, donor agencies engaged less in policies constraining budgetary allowances of the military in favour of reforms that would protect individuals and communities from violence (DFID, 2002). Inevitably, this necessitated an expansion of the security experts’ focus to encompass not only the military but all relevant factors influencing individuals’ security.

The ‘security sector’ and its role

No absolute consensus exists on how far the security sector should stretch and how extensive the list of actors and institutions considered should be. Michael Brzoska proposes either a ‘narrow’ or ‘wide’ definition of the security sector (Brzoska, 2007). The narrow view focuses on public security institutions that protect the state, citizens and external security, while the wider definition includes all potential players, policies and institutions that could be involved in security; DFID see it as “all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it” (DFID, 2002). It is this broad conceptualisation that most authors choose to utilise in policy proposals and implementation guidelines (Hendrickson, 1999; DFID, 2002; Luckham, 2003; Rees, 2006). The broadening of the security sector means the variety of actors it must consider is sprawling, as shown in Figure 5:

⁹ “UNDP defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Good governance has many attributes. It is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is effective in making the best use of resources and is equitable. And it promotes the rule of law” (UNDP, 1997: iii).

Figure 5 - A 'wide' definition of the security sector (Rees, 2006: 7)



Thus, the ‘security sector’ is far more than those institutions of government that execute the will of the state. As Rees explains, “It also includes the structures that oversee institutions which hold the coercive powers of the state. It also refers implicitly to those bodies which would challenge the authority of the state through force. In this respect, an insurgent, warlord or crime boss is as much a part of the security sector as the police officer, soldier, judge, legislator or human rights activist” (Rees, 2006: 8). Without a fully informed perspective of influences on individuals’ security it is difficult to tailor SSR to the specific needs of the communities the concept seeks to help. As a result, this paper adopts a broad approach to the security sector and considers the actors detailed in Figure 5 during its analysis.

In addition to the complex nature of the security sector itself, its reform is conceived as being part of, and supporting, a larger developmental process. As a result security, justice and development are merged onto the same agenda (Chanaa, 2002). The relationship is fundamentally reciprocal and the temptation to use SSR as a standalone solution must be resisted (Wulf, 2004). As the nexus between SSR and Development has been explored it has become increasingly apparent that a ‘one size fits all’ SSR programme is not sympathetic to the varying contexts of developmental

states. The classic SSR agenda was largely conceived for consolidating and transitional democracies, and therefore assumes it is dealing with a reasonably functional state with security institutions that are largely intact (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003). In post-conflict scenarios, where the state is failing or has collapsed, a different set of initial challenges arise regarding the security sector which need to be accounted for. Brzoska has led the way in accepting and rationalising differing contexts by distinguishing between ‘Security Sector Reform’ and ‘Security Sector Reconstruction’ (Brzoska, 2007). ‘Reconstruction’ pertains to the need to rebuild public security institutions and reclaim state monopoly over the use of force. ‘Reform’ seeks to initiate change in existing institutions towards democratic principles of civilian oversight, accountability and the monitoring of human rights. Although the distinction is valid and constructive, there is still a tendency in the literature and operational theatres for ‘security sector reform’ to encompass both reconstruction and reform efforts. This is a lack of clarity that must be kept in mind.¹⁰

Objectives and Implementation of SSR

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a useful tool for donors engaging in SSR to gain perspective on the overall goals of such programmes.

The OECD DAC handbook specifies three main overarching objectives (OECD DAC, 2007: 16):

- i. Improvement of basic security and justice service delivery
- ii. The establishment of an effective governance, oversight and accountability system
- iii. The development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system

SSR is a component of wider political reform and that means new understandings of security are being internalised, “based on human security¹¹ imperatives rather than the security of the rule of a regime, cabal or individual” (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003: 310); however, little comment has been passed on how such a paradigm shift affects the discipline. There are many documented obstacles to achieving SSR goals, some of which are country and context specific and best elaborated upon in relation to particular SSR programmes. Four challenges do appear to be universal to all SSR

¹⁰ ‘SSR’ will encompass both terms under security sector reform for the duration of this paper, unless otherwise stated. This is for purposes of convenience as many authors do not distinguish between ‘reform’ and ‘reconstruction’. It is also to avoid personal interpretation of the acronym when used in the work of others who have not mapped out a distinction.

¹¹ ‘Human security’ is based on seven key criteria relating to the security of the individual, and is further elaborated upon in Chapter 3.

processes to date, and are frequently mentioned in analysis of SSR in Timor-Leste below: The long-term commitment of national and international actors; coordination of donor agencies' interventions; local ownership of the process; and employment of the appropriate expertise (Hendrickson, 1999; Chanaa, 2002; Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; Rees, 2006).

The long-term commitment of national and international actors

SSR processes are not designed to provide quick-fixes and must be seen as a medium to long-term project (Wulf, 2004). However, the main drivers of the process, national and international actors alike, often have much shorter term agendas. Provision of assistance must hinge on a demand for reform from inside the recipient country and the appropriate channels of communication and implementation are necessary (Hendrickson, 1999). This is not always straightforward as SSR is by nature political in seeking to reform an existing order, often threatening the livelihoods and position of powerful elites who resist and obstruct the process. Without the commitment of national powerbrokers the sustainability of a programme will be compromised. The subversive actions of certain politicians in the run-up to the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste are a useful example of this. Equally, it is important that international actors and donors understand that the timeframe of SSR requires long-term investment of capacity and resources. The desire to engage in projects with quick tangible results has led to donors stabilising a situation rather than providing permanent solutions. The UN system of short mandates is a classic example, in the case of Timor-Leste preventing long-term planning for building the capacity of new institutions. It is the less tangible and longer-term goals of supporting greater debate on security issues and building a national consensus on security issues that will determine the success of an SSR intervention (Hendrickson, 1999).

Coordination of donor agencies' interventions

There is no widely accepted blueprint for SSR. This creates a "policy vacuum" (*Ibid*: 39) in which there are a number of competing agencies carrying out programmes in a decentralised manner with very little coordination. There have been at least twelve separate bilateral interests in Timor-Leste over the past nine years, many addressing the same issue with culturally different approaches likely to leave recipients confused (Appendix F). Similarly, in Afghanistan police reform suffers from a lack of direction due to "the international community's competing and conflicting visions of reform" (International Crisis Group, 2007). Thus reform and the competition for funds can become highly politicised and leave the target country without a widely accepted vision for security (Chanaa, 2002). An uncoordinated response to security challenges contradicts the SSR paradigm of addressing the security sector in a holistic sense. The OECD strongly promotes a "strategic approach", highlighting

the importance of joint assessment missions linking bilateral donors through a common understanding of the context of reform and the problems that need to be addressed (OECD DAC, 2007).

Local Ownership of the SSR process

It is vital that reforms are the expression of national will and not felt by the recipient country to be imposed. Brzoska states, “Projects are too often generated externally, ‘from above’, and then sold to the recipient country without needs assessment by independent experts or the recipient government” (Brzoska, 2007: xi). These projects are frequently based on blueprints recommending a particular distribution of power and produce political structures heavily influenced by western conceptions of the state and security (Luckham, 2003). Additionally, a lack of involvement of local civilian actors and underinvestment in their capacity can leave security policy in the hands of uniformed institutions, often leading to state-centric rather than people-centric security initiatives (OECD DAC, 2007). Success of an SSR programme should be measured by the increased capacity of developing countries to analyse, understand and debate their own security issues (Hendrickson, 1999). Afghanistan’s police force has suffered from a lack of effectiveness that is attributed to little Afghan input in shaping the force and building institutional loyalty; the international community’s competing visions of security and focus on training and numbers ignores deeper issues. International Crisis Group (ICG) states, “Properly equipping police is important for efficiency and morale but ultimately it is an ethos of community service that can make the real difference by fostering wider trust” (International Crisis Group, 2007).

Employment of the appropriate expertise

The shape of international interventions into developing countries’ security sectors is a crucial determinate of success. Security has long been considered in a compartmentalised fashion. Serving or former members of security institutions have significant expertise in their sectors but little appreciation of the political and contextual nature of reforms, and the necessity to ensure reform linkages across the system (OECD DAC, 2007). A need exists for greater utilisation of actors and institutions across a spectrum of disciplines, to provide stronger developmental focus to programmes and ensure training in finance, planning and human resources is thorough. Jane Chanaa also points out the benefits of strengthening the relationship between regional specialists and SSR concept builders, in order to make strategies meaningful and worthwhile to the specific context (2002).

An Examination of SSR in Timor-Leste 1999-2008

Almost ten years after the Popular Consultation provided a passage to independence it is appropriate to assess the overall effects of international intervention into Timor-Leste's security sector. The SSR programme can be categorised as both reconstruction and reform, and Brzoska sets out indicators by which to judge the success of measures advocated and implemented by the international community (Brzoska, 2007: ix-x). These indicators include the proliferation of warlords, numbers of illegally held weapons and unassisted ex-combatants, the non-mandated use of security forces, numbers of uniformed men per-capita, ethnic preferences in security forces, and the absence of enforceable and publicly binding norms; they will provide the framework for the remainder of the chapter. Inevitably the headings do not comprehensively delve into every aspect of Timor-Leste's experience and they will be fleshed out with points from other SSR theorists.

Preconditions for SSR

Susan Woodward (2003) sets out two preconditions for an SSR programme to have a chance of success: firstly, there must be fundamental internal political change in order to generate domestic interest in reform. This was present in Timor-Leste from 1999 – 2002. In the aftermath of the 1999 ballot, withdrawing Indonesian militias blazed a trail of "complete destruction", which destroyed most of the minimal infrastructure that existed (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 2). The will for reconstruction and reform was evident in the high levels of cooperation received from the main Timorese interlocutory body, the CNRT, and the warm reception the UN mission was afforded on arrival (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2005). Secondly, an environment of security must exist to avoid the process exacerbating tensions. Although violence was ubiquitous for two weeks in 1999 causing widespread displacement, the offending militias withdrew removing the main conflict factor. Despite many cleavages among Timorese elites, they were unified under the banner of the CNRT in an attempt to provide the new nation with stable foundations. Without any state security institutions there were question marks over the stability of the territory, and for a few months either side of the millennium the population essentially policed itself. The eventual presence of the multinational force (INTERFET) and reinforcement the CIVPOL contingent to 987 by March 2000 negated any threat that might have existed (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000: 22). It can thus be concluded that SSR in Timor-Leste began in relatively favourable circumstances.

Proliferation of warlords, numbers of illegally held weapons and numbers of unassisted ex-combatants

Since the fall of Communism and the halt in superpowers' strategic funding of less well developed countries, many security sectors have become increasingly complex (Chanaa, 2002). The state's monopoly of violence has been lost to some extent to non-state actors. In some instances these fill in for the inadequacies of state security providers and in others can pose a threat to the state and stability (Luckham, 2003). Therefore, it is crucial for an SSR programme to take adequate notice of non-state influences through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, and to provide incentives for potential threats to cooperate and eventually submit to the state's authority.

The UN has stated, "Demobilising combatants is the single most important factor in determining the success of peace operations" (Rees, 2006: 9), yet their facilitation of DDR efforts concerning Falintil was inadequate and can be cited as an influence in recent crises. There was a general feeling from 1999-2000 at UN headquarters that it was inappropriate for UNTAET to deal directly with armed groups and no scope for this was provided in Security Council Resolution 1272 (Hood, 2006). This led to widespread disenchantment with international treatment of perceived national heroes and the Kings College report of the period warned, "there is a very real prospect that Falintil will disintegrate into uncoordinated armed bands", raising the possibility of clashes with peacekeeping troops (Centre for Defence Studies, 2000: 17). Once DDR began, the UN allowed Falintil commanders to coordinate the selection of fighters that would make up the core of the new defence force, which in the event saw 650 chosen out of 1500 cantoned in Aileu (International Crisis Group, 2006^a). The resentment among those not selected led to a proliferation of 'ex-Falintil' veterans groups, despite the relative success of the Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP) in dealing with the immediate economic and social problems faced by those that were demobilised (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003).

Even accounting for such dissatisfaction, civilian possession of weapons has not been widespread in the years since independence. Militias situated in West Timor have either been disarmed or no longer pose a threat. More concern has been expressed about weapons possessed by former Falintil fighters; although most were absorbed into the F-FDTL's armoury some are still not accounted for (*Ibid*: 28). Perhaps the greatest oversight of the DDR process has been the lack of attention paid to clandestine networks that existed during the Indonesian occupation. These were still in operation in the years after Independence and Susana Barnes, amongst others, believes there

is a direct link between the lack of attention paid to these members of the resistance and the proliferation of ‘martial arts gangs’ (2008, pers. comm., 29 April). The prominence of these groups in the 2006 crisis and their promulgating of much violence in 2007 suggest more could have been done to demobilise and reintegrate the extended resistance effort.

DDR in Timor-Leste removed the threat of a widely armed civilian population but did not manage to satisfy all of those who believed their sacrifices entitled them to a greater dividend at Independence. The escalation of violence in April and May 2006 can be partly attributed to the intervention of both veteran and martial arts groups (United Nations, 2006), suggesting there is some way to go before this arm of SSR can be considered a success.

Non-mandated use of security forces

The vulnerability of security forces to manipulation is a good indication of the strength of such institutions, and the extent to which loyalty is commanded by individuals rather than their rank. Hendrickson warns that the short-termism of most international interventions encourages a tendency to focus on what is immediately achievable neglecting more intricate challenges (1999: 18). This certainly can be applied to the formation of security institutions, as Rees states, “It is impossible to create such complex institutions in a matter of a few months or years, in any society, let alone post-conflict scenarios with severe resource and/or human capacity limitations (2006: 16).

The 2006 crisis saw the police (PNTL) and F-FDTL turn on one another and become personal instruments in a battle between powerful elites. This was typified by the Minister of the Interior, Rogerio Lobato’s, subversion of authority over the police force into his person, and the attack on the house of F-FDTL commander Tuar Matan Ruak by PNTL personnel (International Crisis Group, 2006^a). The Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the issue concluded that both forces’ functioning was hampered by the manner of their creation (United Nations, 2006: 18). The PNTL was established hastily in 2001 with a significant emphasis on training and less on the institution itself. There was limited development of civilian oversight, administrative support, complaint mechanisms or capacity to create a budget (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003). Recruitment of the police was fundamentally flawed, as the force was created around a core of officers that had served under the Indonesian occupation, creating widespread disillusionment. The selection of the rest of the force was heavily biased towards those that could speak English and were familiar with “culturally western interviewing techniques” (Hood, 2006: 64). Training of the fledgling recruits was also influenced by

the perceived urgency of a functioning indigenous police force, with former members of POLRI¹² undergoing only four weeks of instruction, and new recruits subjected to just three months of classroom tuition before joining UN police force patrols as observers (*Ibid*).

As previously mentioned, the selection of defence forces through an internal, unaccountable process meant a lack of transparency and the proliferation of ‘shadow networks’ (Chanaa, 2002: 48); a series of relationships that mutually reinforce standing and wealth and which undermine the impersonal chain of command that should be the basis of any uniformed institution. Furthermore, the UN and other donors’ reluctance to engage directly with defence force development meant that the responsibility fell to an ad hoc group of bilateral advisors loosely grouped under the Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD). Although the ODFD achieved some success it suffered from the lack of a clearly delineated role alongside national actors and the UN.

Both the PNTL and F-FDTL were eventually subverted in 2006 due to their hasty creation and a lack of appropriate space to develop institutional, as well as human, capacity. Rees notes, “Decisions made in the planning stages and early days of a peace operation have a lasting impact on the likelihood of success” (2006: 10). This failing almost certainly explains the frosty reception encountered by the UN since their return in 2006, particularly in attempts to reform the police. The ‘Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding’ (RRR) plan has been roundly criticised by national and international actors alike (International Crisis Group, 2008^a). The same mistakes that led to the current flaws are being repeated; the plan was conceived without any significant East Timorese involvement, much like those around independence, and is overly ambitious without providing any details on the proposed methods of implementation. ICG notes that there is genuine concern over whether the UN can justify repeatedly reforming the institutions it helped create (2008^a).

Proportion of the Population in Uniform

Numbers of uniformed security personnel as a ratio to the overall population has in the past been a useful determinate of the extent of military and police power, and possibly a guide to the amount of political influence such institutions wield. The ‘security sector reconstruction’ process in Timor-Leste involved the creation of security institutions, and it seems that numbers were successfully restricted to manageable levels. However, the modern security sector is dynamic and reduced visibility does not necessarily mean curtailed political influence (Luckham, 2003).

¹² The police force under Indonesian occupation.

The composition and size of the defence force for Timor-Leste was a matter of controversy, with some national and international actors favouring a ‘gendarmerie’ instead. An independent study had to be commissioned and this resulted in a compromise solution of a force consisting of a 1,500 strong professional light infantry and a volunteer reserve corps of another 1,500 to call upon if needed, which translates to around one full-time soldier for every 650 civilians (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003: 31). The police had a similarly positive ratio, with around 3,000 members at the end of UNMISET’s mandate (Hood, 2006: 64). However, from 2002 until 2006 new PNTL units were created, including a Police Reserve Unit, a Border Patrol Unit and paramilitary police units (United Nations, 2006). These were not well received by many opponents of the incumbent government and created an overlap of functions with the military. The 2006 crisis endorsed the notion that a lack of visibility does not necessarily inhibit influence. The crisis revealed both security forces’ close links with civilian groups when they went as far as to arm them in panic at the increasing scale of the violence. Although the low numbers of uniformed personnel in Timor-Leste is positive, there are still issues to resolve over the security institutions’ influence in society and on Timorese politics.

Ethnic Preferences in the National Security Apparatus

The heightened hostility between the police and military is largely attributed to increasing ethnicisation along geographical lines; tensions have emerged between personnel originating from the east and those from the west of the country. It is unclear whether this is a longstanding fracture in society hidden by the prioritisation of resistance against the Indonesians, or if it is a relatively new phenomenon possibly created by the security forces. An identifiable trend exists in countries with malfunctioning security sectors for control to be maintained through a manipulation of kinship and ethnicity (Chanaa, 2002: 44). Yet, it is equally conceivable that the seeming split along east-west boundaries could have been due to legitimate grievances rooted in geographical logistics that simply weren’t dealt with by under-developed institutions.

The flawed selection procedures for admittance into both the police and military left both institutions open to nepotism or even ethnicisation. The formation of the police around a core of former POLRI officers immediately gave those from the west of the country a greater presence at senior ranks, as there was greater cooperation with Indonesian authorities by those situated closest to the border. The selection process for the F-FDTL was similarly detrimental to the long-term viability of the institution; being a closed affair it allowed former Falintil commanders to choose those that they saw fit. 56% of the original force was from the east, despite easterners making up

only 35% of the overall population, and it was felt that old resistance loyalties were being placed above the effective formation of a defence force (United Nations, 2006: 53). A key failing became the unresponsiveness of the F-FDTL to complaints brought against it, particularly from westerners. The sacking of 594 dissenters in 2006 was the culmination of a series of attempts made by westerners to have acknowledged the logistical difficulties presented by stationing of F-FDTL bases in the east of the country (International Crisis Group, 2006^a). Whether ethnically motivated or not, the dismissal gave the impression that the army was an institution in which eastern origins was a benefit. Rogerio Lobato ruthlessly exploited this encouraging those claiming discrimination to nurse their grievances. In addition, he set up extra police units staffed almost exclusively with westerners, which were armed after UNMISSET expired in 2004 (United Nations, 2006: 20).

Although both institutions became synonymous with geographical areas, it is unclear whether this was deliberate or simply a lack of transparency, accountability and sufficient means of recourse for those with grievances. If the latter, this must in part be attributed to the UN's "cursory" planning for the post-independence era (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2005: 141). Only in 2008, almost a decade after the intervention, is a national security policy under construction, with the support of the UN's Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU). In the policy vacuum that has existed it has been difficult to define each institution's exact roles and structure, allowing partisan relationships to develop and the PNTL to expand without sufficient oversight. To move forward and avoid the recurrence of events witnessed in 2006 and 2007, it is vital that clear policies are developed and a 'roadmap' produced to avoid ad-hoc, non-constitutional reforms.

The Absence of Enforceable and Publicly Binding Norms

The rule of law, democratic oversight of the security sector and the appropriate checks and balances provided by a rounded sector are crucial to the sustainability of SSR processes. There is a clear distinction between the state having democratic control over a territory and an International presence ensuring the state's control (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003: 318). The importance of democratic, rather than simply civilian, control also cannot be understated, and the security sector should ideally grow alongside the reform of democratic institutions (*Ibid*: 322).

A unified body of law does not exist in Timor-Leste, instead authority is gained from a variety of influences ranging from former Indonesian law, some Portuguese regulations, decrees passed by UNTAET, and other sources, most of which has never passed through parliament. Consequently, there is significant confusion over the laws governing the security sector (International Crisis Group, 2008^a). The presence of democratic control of the security sector is also debatable. The UN

relinquished executive authority over the PNTL in 2004, and it was reassumed through the supplemental agreement in 2006. The PNTL was under genuine national control for just two years, during which time the force became fractured and the personal fiefdom of its minister, and contributed in large part to the breakdown of order in 2006. The Defence Force has been afforded even less oversight, with not a single East Timorese civil servant trained to assume any responsibilities related to the F-FDTL at independence (Hood, 2006: 72). The Commission of Inquiry into the 2006 crisis confirmed that only Defence Minister, Roque Rodrigues, had any responsibility for government oversight of the military (United Nations, 2006). In response to a dearth of administrative and policy support the F-FDTL have generated their own policy document, Force 2020. This is providing direction for the future of the force despite never having passed through parliament or received government endorsement. The parliamentary commission detailed to deal in Defence and National Security issues, Commission B, along with the Parliament itself, were described as “weak structures with little institutional capacity to oversee the security sector” (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003: 44). The continuing irrelevance of the legislature and its inability to seize democratic control allows documents such as ‘Force 2020’ to dictate policy.

The enforcement of the law and norms governing the security sector is also hampered by the under-developed and lightly staffed judicial system. The absence of constitutionally stipulated courts is a consequence of circumstance and a lack of guidance in this area of reconstruction. Decimation of the legal sector during conflict is common (Baker & Scheye, 2007) and Timor-Leste suffered this fate. UNTAET encountered a scarcity of qualified legal professionals as no judges or prosecutors remained, and only sixty people with law qualifications put forward their CV. Minimal experience led to eight being considered of a sufficient standard to proceed into the East Timorese judiciary (Hohe, 2003: 337). The eight judges were hastily appointed by UNTAET before a judicial system had been formalised, meaning much of the training the judges received was not specific to the system in which they would be operating (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003). Development of the judiciary also suffered from an uncoordinated approach due to the number of bilateral actors seeking an input. The result was a disproportionate focus on the processing of serious crimes leaving more routine legal capabilities inefficient, a failing that has contributed to the slow turnover of cases since independence (*Ibid*). A further factor undermining the legal sector’s prospects for success was the decision not to carry out a widespread assessment of the legal and judicial landscape. Without detailed knowledge of the context it was attempting to provide for, the system proved unresponsive to the needs of the population (*Ibid*). Although the desirability of a purely indigenous judiciary for symbolic purposes is understandable, the speed with which it was created resulted in an inexperienced and under qualified sector having to be reinforced with international legal personnel.

Baker & Scheye argue that peace operations should focus less on normative provision of security and more on sources of security in reality (2003). However, the centrality of universal human rights to the UN prevented serious consideration of local security provisions, whose methods were perceived to include inherent abuses of Rights (Mearns, 2001). The lack of a functioning judiciary means UNPOL, the PNTL and the general population all have carefully consider the expediency of using formal methods of justice (Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2003). Despite international specialists fulfilling some functions in the investigation of serious crimes, the police are forced to weigh up the likelihood of a case being heard in the mandatory 72 hours, and assess whether justice would be better served by finding a local solution. This dilemma is complicated further by the shortage of detention facilities. Only three prisons are functional, with conditions overcrowded and breakouts frequent, meaning some arrests have to be overlooked due to limited space (International Crisis Group, 2008^a). For the East Timorese, concerns over the cumbersome nature of the process are matched by worries that the outcome of formal justice is not “visibly just” and on “their terms”; these are important elements in local conflict resolution (Mearns, 2001: 39). It is argued that the lack of appropriate acknowledgement of ‘tradition’ has placed an intolerable burden on an inadequate judiciary and left enforcement of the law particularly difficult for security institutions (Hohe & Nixon, 2003).

Conclusion

The context of Timor-Leste as a platform for SSR was challenging both in terms of the wanton destruction and lack of capacity found on Independence. The range of powers granted to the UN administration during the first two years of statehood was recognition of this. SSR is a young discipline, with a special emphasis on the importance of context to its chances of success. Therefore it was with almost no guidance that the UN embarked on rebuilding the country, and in particular reconstructing the security sector. Many of the problems inherent to SSR, which have not been solved satisfactorily anywhere, were evident in Timor-Leste. There was a great pressure on UN employees to produce tangible results, and given a very short period in which to plan it is unsurprising that some areas were prioritised to the detriment of others. With little expertise or experience amongst the indigenous population, the process was driven by external actors whilst attempting to encourage local ownership.

Despite the difficulties encountered there is no escaping the fact that the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘reform’ processes in Timor-Leste have so far failed to fully satisfy any of the three objectives set out by the OECD DAC. Although basic security is guaranteed by an international presence, indigenous

provision of security and justice does not exist. Serious doubts persist over the long-term stability of uniformed security institutions rife with ethnic tension and indiscipline, and the judiciary is operating well below its envisaged capacity, leaving many to look elsewhere for justice. Legislative and democratic oversight of the security sector remains very weak, with Commission B lacking the expertise and power to hold the security sector to account, and ministerial positions vulnerable to manipulation by opportunistic actors. Crucially, the third objective has also been seriously neglected, as it has taken close to ten years for the development of a national security framework to begin. This suggests a lack of flexibility and initiative from international actors, and it will be some time before the East Timorese are able to assess and reform the security sector unassisted.

Unquestionably there is a disparity between the SSR conceptualised in the literature and what is occurring in reality; operational changes are necessary if the discipline is to reverse a trend of disappointing results. New approaches must be explored that seek to improve the shape of SSR programmes. A closer look at the theoretical discourses behind SSR is a good starting point from which to distil useful guidance for translating theory into practice.

Chapter 3: Deconstructing SSR

"The Success of SSR will require a broader knowledge of literature spanning many different disciplines" (Hendrickson, 1999: 12)

SSR's failure to produce adequate results in Timor-Leste and beyond necessitates that the concept is unpicked and its core components examined, in order to identify areas of current practice that can be improved upon. This chapter will identify the separate theoretical elements which combine under the 'SSR' heading and review current thinking in each field. The most important theoretical discourses are investigated in greater detail, to identify concepts and pitfalls that must be given greater emphasis in SSR literature and incorporated into practical guidelines. This will provide insight into questions posed earlier regarding the type of security SSR seeks to deliver, the implications of such a working definition, and the most appropriate methods through which the discipline can contribute to the developmental process. The theoretical exploration will also deliver a framework through which SSR programmes can be examined for weaknesses, and improvements suggested.

Development

SSR is a developmental tool aimed at providing citizen security within a wider set of development objectives (Chanaa, 2002). However, this set of 'development objectives' is fluid, and referred to without a clear understanding of what they are or the means through which developing countries can achieve them. If we are to optimise the use of SSR it will be important to have a clear understanding of the ends to which it is being deployed, and the exact role the concept should play in any process aimed at attaining those ends.

SSR is part of a wider paradigm shift in development thinking, commonly referred to as the 'post-Washington consensus' (Stiglitz, 2003). This encompasses a move away from the exclusively economic policies of the 1980s and early 1990s, increasingly focussing on the individual and societal aspects of development in addition to economic components. The importance of politics has also been recognised in this new agenda, with the role of national governments, civil society and international agencies all seen as being fundamental to its success (*Ibid*). A conception of

development is now incomplete if it does not place the individual at the centre of all efforts and omits any one of the realms of politics, society, the legal sector and economics as a constituent part (Sen, 1999).

'Development as Freedom'

It is important to begin from a normative perspective when attempting to decipher developmental objectives and the optimum means of reaching them; Amartya Sen's (1999) conceptualisation of development as freedom is a suitable starting point. Sen sees freedom as having a 'constitutive' and 'instrumental' role in development. In other words it should be the primary end of development and the principal means of achieving it. He argues this encourages focus on the ends of development, which are too often lost in the scramble to find the appropriate means. The prioritisation of freedom has two benefits; it provides a comparable evaluative framework for assessing the progress of development through the freedom individuals enjoy, and is also the most effective route to development as freedoms are interconnected and reinforce one another (Sen, 1999: 4). The freedoms Sen describes fall under two broad headings of 'basic' and 'substantive': basic freedoms essentially constitute the freedom to survive, while the substantive variety includes more intricate ideas such as the rights of women and political liberties.

As freedoms are constitutive of development (i.e. what development is), there is no need to justify them indirectly in terms of the benefits they bring to the economic and political spheres; one simply is not maintaining conceptual integrity in approaching development without considering them.¹³ Freedoms include those provided by the rule of law and adherence to it. Comprehensive legal and judicial reform is therefore as important as the political, social or economic spheres when conceptualising development, and equally important in the support it can provide to the other pillars during the process (Sen, 2000). The security sector is not just important to a developmental process; the process cannot be considered without it, making its reconstruction or reform inescapable.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to introduce blanket freedoms and the means of their provision to a less developed society and expect the dividends to be felt without some difficulties. A closer

¹³ To explain this difficult idea further Sen provides an analogy: one can consider the weather through its various different aspects (the clouds, the rain, the sun etc) and comment on their interdependence – e.g. the clouds are associated with more rain, rain associated with lack of sun etc. However, when considering 'a typical summer's day' the idea has many different components – temperature, sun, breeze etc, but the issue is not one of interdependence. Instead, it is of having all the relevant information to make a judgement; if some of the information is missing, e.g. on temperature, then any judgement would be conceptually incomplete as a crucial element upon which it should be based is missing. Conceptual integrity of an idea demands that all the information is considered together (Sen, 2000).

look at the developmental process is needed in order to optimise the use of SSR to developmental ends.

States of Society

Robert Bates's study of the political economy of development, entitled 'Prosperity and Violence' (2001), stresses that there are certain loose stages through which a society travels to reach the modern state. Each stage is based on the optimal political conditions a community can provide to ensure there is peace and the economy prospers as much as possible. The evolution he charts begins with agrarian societies, and describes the early centralisation of power before explaining the formation of the modern state. The key point made throughout is that the process was rational. The transition from one form of governance to the next is based on a common decision by certain members of society to change the way violence¹⁴ is deployed in order to support prosperity and further their own interests. An important lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that all societies are at a certain point along this spectrum; movement towards development requires an *evolution* of conditions to occur. Society employs violence in a certain way because it best addresses the needs of specific modes of production and exchange at that time. If externally encouraging a change to the form of violence employed, one must be very aware of the vulnerabilities that could be exposed as a result.

An agrarian society sees kinship dominate and families organise production, consumption and wealth. These traits are commonly found outside of the major centres in developing and post-conflict states and agrarianism is useful for illustrating the significance of forms of organisation that are often seen as backward. It also provides a useful example of the importance of Bates's work. He sees these societies as dynamic, but claims that in accepting the kinship group as dominant, societies are settling for poverty as the price of peace (Bates, 2001: 33). The set-up of the political economy is directed towards mitigating risks. The kinship unit is spread out across the land in order to achieve variety in the crops grown and guard against extreme weather conditions decimating food supplies. If natural disaster or adverse conditions prevail in one area, the family unit makes up the shortfall through donating the surplus that has been produced in a different area. Membership of the family is therefore expensive; even when surplus produce is not consumed by the family, a deterrent against those who wish to plunder it must be established. Investment in a reputation of, violence is vital to protection of assets (*Ibid*: 44). As a result of this conservatism prosperity is sacrificed. Specialising in a cash crop carries too much risk of crop failure, resources are invested in violent

¹⁴ Bates uses 'violence' as a substitute for 'force', which more commonly used throughout developmental and sociological literature.

materials and deterring raiders rather than technological advances, and the peace is fragile. Where industrial societies possess markets for risk through insurance and borrowing, agrarian societies self-insure (*Ibid*: 38). The salience of the kinship group is vital for this purpose and only when wealth increases and individuals decide to pay for a ‘specialist in violence’ (a central state) does this state of affairs change.

Recognising the state of society is crucial to determining what changes SSR suggests, particularly when attempting to alter a people’s security provision. The introduction of new arrangements of violence without consideration for the structures that already exist is a risk, particularly for those less well off. The definition of ‘development’ advanced by Stiglitz, that it is the “transformation of society” (Stiglitz, 2003: 77), is perhaps a more logical approach for a practical discipline such as SSR. This approach embraces the normative ends outlined by Sen, while acknowledging the subtleties of the developmental process identified by Bates and the pragmatism that may at times be necessary. In the current developmental climate this ‘transformation’ revolves to a great extent around the transition to democracy. SSR is often termed the “democratic control and reform of the security sector” (Caparini & Fluri, 2000) and it is thus useful to briefly examine the relationship between development and democracy.

Democracy

Democracy is also a constitutive element of development in recognition of the open public debate and discussion it promotes (Sen, 1999: 148). For the purposes of this discussion the normative should be set aside and the practical value of democracy to development must be investigated, in order to identify any impact upon SSR as a developmental tool. The definition of democracy is important to an analysis of its relationship with development. There are a range of definitions beginning with Schumpeter’s minimalistic conception of “a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1976: 269), through Dahl’s seven key criteria of ‘Polyarchy’ (1971), to more holistic conceptions developed in response to the failure of emerging democracies. The latter is adopted in this paper; thus democracy is “based on a free and fair electoral process, the respect of basic civil and political rights, and the provision of accountability mechanisms” (Menocal, 2007: 2).

The compatibility of development and democracy

The incorporation of democracy into development processes has come through its inextricable links with capitalist and mixed economies, and also an impressive security record of two fully fledged democracies having never gone to war with one another (Leftwich, 2005). It is also seen an integral

component of the ‘Good Governance’ agenda, and it is in this guise that the security sector is most influenced; “Good governance when applied to the security sector means the effective, efficient, participatory, accountable and transparent functioning of state institutions that have a monopoly of legitimate use of coercion” (Caparini & Fluri, 2000: 8). However, SSR’s links with both the developmental process and democratic agenda could prove problematic due to the strained relationship between the two. Although some see democracy as a universal value, complimentary to and even a part of the developmental process (Sen, 1999), others have observed a tension in their coexistence (Leftwich, 2005). Leftwich believes development is a treacherous activity due to the radical transformations that take place as a result. This inevitably leads to changes in the distribution of power, threatening certain actors’ livelihoods, and creating an interest in obstructing the process. As a result, the most successful developmental states have been strong, in order to pursue particular policies rigorously and stand up to resistance from sectors favouring the status quo. Conversely, he sees democracy as an essentially conservative system of power designed for stability rather than change. Termed “institutionalizing uncertainty” (Przeworski quoted in Leftwich, 2005: 696), the constant battle to accommodate various interests in order to retain power does not facilitate the advancement of a radical developmental agenda. This contradiction is worth noting in the context of SSR. As a developmental tool, SSR is supposed to provide institutions that support an agenda of radical change, while at the same time providing stability and accountability through the good governance agenda. This is evidently an extremely delicate task. The possibility that the concurrent pursuit of democracy and development could be counterproductive poses a tough question for those attempting to translate SSR theory into practice: might some democratic principles have to be sacrificed in the name of development?

Security

Understanding the role security plays within the developmental process and comprehensive knowledge of what constitutes ‘security’ are natural priorities for a discipline engaged in reform and development of the security sector. A broad consensus exists in the development community that security is a prerequisite to development, while enduring security is impossible without development. Meanwhile, conceptions of ‘security’ have changed dramatically alongside shifts in developmental thinking; during the Cold War the concentration was on geopolitical security (the security of states), whereas more modern ideas amalgamate geopolitical and biopolitical elements (the security of populations) to produce a much more comprehensive model (Duffield, 2005). Both the constitution and role of ‘security’ in development must be thoroughly comprehended if SSR is to contribute in the most effective manner to overriding developmental objectives.

Security as a prerequisite to development

The rationale behind security's instrumental role in development, excluding its normative value, must be established before its constitution can be elaborated upon. Mark Duffield sees security as being particularly important within, rather than between states, as that is the form most conflicts have assumed since the fall of communism. He states, "The unrestrained barbarism of internal conflict destroys the very possibility of self-reproduction; it wrecks public infrastructures, ruins livelihood systems, fragments social solidarity and tips the dynamics of population into disequilibrium, compounding the risk of enduring cycles of violence and displacement. Consequently, in terms of achieving a regulatory biopolitics of self-reproduction, that is, sustainable development, internal war becomes '... development in reverse' (Collier et al., 2003)" (Duffield, 2005: 153). The value of security is therefore to provide a solid base from which development can begin. A secure environment free from private protection of property deters individuals and families from "wasteful investments in military preparation and raiding" and is likely to encourage a healthier and more productive balance of work and leisure (Bates et al., 2002: 605). This conforms to the notion of the modern democratic state advanced by Max Weber, defined by its claims over the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Gerth & Mills, 1948: 78), and currently seen as the best medium through which to pursue development. Weber also highlights the importance of the legitimacy of security; he differentiates between order through expediency, when society conforms to an authority through purposes of self-interest, and legitimacy, where rules are conformed to because they are imposed through widely accepted procedure (Weber, 1964). This is the root of heavy emphasis placed on 'local ownership' by much contemporary literature (e.g. DFID, 2002). Whereas order imposed by an international agency in a developing nation is adhered to because it is expedient for the local population to do so, a locally owned process is far more likely to achieve common acceptance and hence prove sustainable beyond any international presence.

Human Security

An evolution of thinking has also taken place on the type of security that SSR should strive to deliver. In a progression from neo-liberal notions of competitive and possessive individualism, where the individual was responsible for securing her own security through use of the market, modern security thinking has aligned itself with the 'post-Washington consensus' and placed basic individual needs and human dignity as its primary concerns (Thomas, 2001). This new concept was christened 'human security' by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. Human security is described as "a process of widening the range of people's choices" through two major components: the freedom


from fear and the freedom from want (UNDP, 1994: 23-24). The list of threats to Human Security are categorised under seven major headings: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security; it is these broad areas that security sector reconstruction and reform should seek to enhance, as basic freedoms individuals are entitled to and for their role in reducing a society's propensity for conflict (Thomas, 2001). The centrality of human security is widely acknowledged in SSR literature (Hendrickson, 1999; Cawthra & Luckham, 2003), but its impact on procedure is less commented upon. The aim must be to contribute towards security under the seven criteria mentioned, thereby ensuring a stable base for development towards a legitimate state. This is a complex task that requires a comprehensive appraisal of the state of society, in order that security is provided through the most suitable means in the specific context without leaving the population vulnerable. Understanding the principal threats to human security will also have become a priority in order that programmes can be tailored to their removal.

The Post-war society

A recent war is likely to have an impact on the state of society and threats to human security. The importance of a post-war dynamic to an SSR programme has led to the introduction of an alternative term, 'Security Sector Reconstruction', in order to recognise its distinctive nature. There are both peculiar behavioural aspects of post-war states and extra societal dimensions and challenges to account for.

In a study of aid and post-conflict societies, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identified useful characteristics and patterns of aid absorption that are constructive for the examination and analyses of SSR programmes. They found that aid was rendered unusually productive by the need to restore infrastructure juxtaposed against a collapse of revenues. However, there are dynamics in post-war societies, usually remnants of the war itself, which could prove potential obstacles to a successful SSR process. Christopher Mitchell has pointed out that sources of conflict formation are almost always found in a prior change that disturbs a social hierarchy (2005). Changes in dynamics that occur in conflict affected societies are best demonstrated in Galtung's basic model of conflict:

Figure 6 - Galtung's basic model of conflict (in Mitchell, 2005: 8)



Using this model there can be said to be four types of change leading to conflict; there is a change to the underlying structure of a society, which can create goal incompatibility between actors. Enmity is intensified by the behaviour of the disparate actors in following their divergent goals, and also by their attitudes towards, and the perceived attitudes of, an 'Other'. These factors are significant because underlying conflict is not necessarily solved with the onset of peace. The remnants of societal conflict and certain actors with confrontational policies can offer significant obstacles to moving the developmental process forward (Mitchell, 2005).

Institutions

The discussion up to the present point has focussed on the responsibilities SSR faces at a societal and human level; the third fundamental level on which SSR must be addressed is the institutions which are set up to regulate security. The dynamic nature of institutions and their widespread impact and influence on the surrounding environment leads to a potentially sprawling subject if one does not set parameters. This paper will focus on political institutions; it details the functions of formal and informal institutions, how the two spheres and individual institutions interact, and the impact research in the area could have on SSR doctrine. Initially, it is important to distinguish analytically between 'institutions', 'policy', and 'organisations' (Leftwich, 2007: 8). 'Policy' should be seen as the aims and purposes of a plan of action without necessarily specifying the means for its

realisation, while ‘organisations’ are the players operating within a certain set of rules. These two terms should be kept strictly separate from ‘institutions’, in order that the synthesis of the three is properly understood (*Ibid*: 8-11).

Formal Institutions

Leftwich defines institutions thus: “the essential structural properties of societies (or groups within them) which are constituted by the rules and procedures that constrain some forms of behaviour and interaction between people and groups and enable others in social, economic and political domains” (2007: 11). However, this classical definition does not distinguish between the formal and informal domains, and it is therefore necessary to add the caveat that formal institutions are the rules and procedures “created, communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004: 727). From a historical perspective there are no blueprint institutions or institutional arrangements that are effective in all contexts. ‘Historical Institutionalism’ embraces this line proposing that in addition to the neo-liberal ‘rational-choice institutionalism’, which sees institutions as a combination of incentive structures for different interests allowing an equilibrium to be reached, the historical and cultural influences on the creation of institutions are also vitally important (Leftwich, 2007). Far from simply aggregating interests, the process of creating institutions can be a painful one as they are endogenously produced by a society over a period of time (Sindzingre & Stein, 2002). The success of formal political institutions depends on gaining widespread agreement (legitimacy) for the ‘rules of the game’ they stipulate, allowing change to occur without threatening the stability of politics. Success also depends heavily on the quality of relations between institutions, and the ability to accommodate prevailing political forces, both of which are core facets of a central state. Recognition of causal linkages is crucial for the design and implementation of SSR programmes. Institutions cannot be seen simply as individual entities to be built and strengthened in isolation. Instead, their ability to forge productive relationships and a coherent set of rules is equally important, largely determining whether a state is effective (Leftwich, 2007).

A practical illustration of the dynamics detailed above with implications for the security sector is found in Weber’s description of rational legal authority (Weber, 1964). He suggests that every body of law “consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally established [the state]” (Weber, 1964: 330). It is also essential that the administrative process (the judiciary, uniformed enforcement etc) follows principles that are not widely disapproved of; obedience to the rules cannot be out of personal loyalty. Therefore, rational legal

authority depends on a group of institutions cooperating to produce a body of law and a strong set of administrative institutions to enforce it, with the two areas also enjoying a complementary relationship. If the procedure for producing laws and the means of their administration are agreed upon by political elites and accepted by wider elements in society, legitimacy is obtained and legal authority should be in effect.

Informal Institutions

Academic writing on institutions over the past decade, so-called ‘new institutionalism’, suggests that to focus on formal political institutions when analysing the state is to take too narrow an approach. There are in fact countless informal institutions which have an impact from the top of government down to the rules governing everyday low-level political activity. The distinction between the formal and informal spheres should not be seen as one of polar opposites, rather any differences should constitute a continuum of activities (Sindzingre & Stein, 2002).

Helmke and Levitsky describe informal institutions as, “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (2004: 727). They are based solely on their existence and effectiveness as they are not written down, and gain legitimacy from social acceptance. With no codification and stipulation for a rule-making authority, change in such institutions can be a lengthy process as they are internalised and develop indigenously. However, dynamism does exist as they are forced to adapt to survive (Lauth, 2000). There are four types of informal institution, which all exist by exploiting formal institutions in one way or another: ‘complementary’ forms, which fill gaps and enhance the formal sector; ‘accommodating’ informal rules, which alter but don’t undermine formal institutions; ‘competing’ informal institutions which distort the formal sector by offering an alternative; and finally ‘substitutive’ institutions which set out to achieve what formal institutions should be achieving (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).

For the purposes of deconstructing SSR, informal rules have two major influences that must be acknowledged; the effect they can have on formal institutions and the alternative they can provide to inadequate official procedures and provisions. Informal institutions can create or intensify the incentives to comply with formal rules, for example through an underlying norm of discipline, and will sometimes provide a code of conduct where formal stipulations are deficient in doing so (Ibid: 728). Alternatively, competing informal practices, such as clientelism, nepotism and corruption can distort a formal institution if not properly accounted for. Commonly their prevalence stems from the social costs actors pay if they adhere to formal rules, and therefore combating them requires an

understanding of wider social traditions. In reverse, informal institutions can compensate for the weakness of state structures and act as a substitute (Ibid, 2004). Kinship groups have common survival and welfare interests but weak ties with the state, often filling in for the state in provision of services. They are seen as problematic in some quarters due to conflicts with certain universally constituted rights, and the encouragement of trust in personalities rather than formal institutions. However, Lauth points out that the exploitation of democratic structures coming to be interpreted as true democratic practice, and therefore not worth defending, is not an attractive alternative (2000: 34). There are elements of customary law which don't conflict with democratic principles and that can be converted into a legal source of formal law. Although custom is slow to develop, if codified, it can contribute to the development of a body of law in areas which have seen little regulation in the past (Ibid: 42).

Recognition of the dynamics of formal institutions and the effects of informal institutions is likely to give an SSR programme a far higher chance of success. A definition of the 'security sector' includes "the intricate network of institutional instruments and/or bodies of people that can either positively or negatively affect public safety and the rule of law" (Rees, 2006: 8). However, there is a danger of seeing institutions as single entities without concentrating on causal linkages for the purposes of a manageable workload and simple logistics. Of more pressing concern is the need for engagement with informal rules and structures. SSR is often tasked with building and reforming formal institutions, and it is clear this task would be substantially aided by an appreciation of the informal culture of the polity. Institutional change never operates on a 'tabula rosa', as such a thing does not exist. There is always the danger of a "transplant effect", whereby superimposed formal laws conflict with existing informal rules (Sindzingre & Stein, 2002: 9). Those structures rooted in local tradition and filling in for state inadequacies also require consideration. Focussing on the state alone without accounting for the indigenous strengths of society can be counterproductive, as acknowledgement and interaction can provide an SSR effort with what has termed "grounded legitimacy" (Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2008: 2). It would therefore be advisable not to treat political systems as either a Weberian state or a customary order, and instead to investigate ways in which customary institutions can be harnessed alongside a modern state in a 'hybrid political order' (Ibid, 2008).

Conclusion

The value of deconstructing SSR into its component parts is found in the lessons that are learnt and the contradictions within the theory that might hinder the process from reaching its full

potential. A clear set of developmental objectives and a normative endpoint are necessary; however, a nuanced and sympathetic approach is most likely to yield results. In particular, understanding developmental processes of the past and identifying varying states of society, from agrarian through to the modern state, can help in forming a programme that can engage rather than gazump progress towards modernity. Even more importantly, an understanding of society will ensure that important risk management mechanisms remain intact and the population is not left exposed and vulnerable. Consequently pragmatism dictates it is easier for SSR to view the developmental process as a ‘transformation of society’, rather than a normative alternative advocating immediate blanket freedom.

This definition of development does not necessarily dovetail with demands for the process to follow democratic norms. There is evidence that points to democracy’s accommodating and centrist nature not effectively supporting a developmental agenda for change; this is seen to require a strong central state in order to face down opposition from the losers of the process. SSR faces a daunting challenge of fulfilling both developmental and democratic criteria, and it is a potential limitation that should be acknowledged. Conversely, the existence of a neutral and reliable arbiter of force, such as a democratic state, is vitally important for reconstruction efforts in particular to remove the private provision of security. This allows individuals and families to concentrate on effective production and enjoy a good standard of living. The key to a successful SSR programme in general is its contribution to the satisfaction of human security criteria, thereby creating a stable base for development, which allows for further reforms of the security sector in line with the ‘good governance’ agenda.

This is far easier said than done, particularly as some programmes are initiated as part of reconstruction efforts in post-war countries. The added element of recent violence can point towards underlying societal conflict, a resistance to change and very specific conditions for growth, all of which have to be factored into an already complex process. Nevertheless, it is possible that effective institutions setting appropriate ‘rules of the game’ can claim legitimacy in the most difficult of circumstances, satisfying the security needs of individuals within their jurisdiction. In order for this to occur a deeper understanding of institutions in general is needed; appreciation of the dynamics of a successful set of formal institutions must be coupled with an effective harnessing of informal counterparts. Fundamentally, a strong state relies not only on strong individual formal institutions but also a successful set of complimentary linkages between them. These institutions must embrace beneficial informal rules of society in order that they don’t conflict and render the formal sector weak and impotent. Furthermore, in countries where the state has been deficient in providing for the needs of a population, alternative structures are most likely in place to fill in gaps. In the

interests of gaining legitimacy and to regulate areas previously beyond the state's control, it is worth considering approval of certain customary laws that don't violate democratic principles to form a 'hybrid political order'.

Chapter 4: A New Perspective of Timor-Leste and its Security

While serving officers have technical expertise in their sectors, more guidance is needed enable these officers to have a better understanding of: (i) the political and contextual nature of security reforms; and (ii) the need to ensure reform linkages across the system (OECD DAC, 2007: 14).

The appraisal of SSR efforts in Timor-Leste carried out in Chapter 2 concluded that under difficult circumstances, the efforts of the UN to provide stability and security for the population were deeply flawed. Almost ten years after the Popular Consultation the country is still reliant on international forces to guarantee peace, and security institutions have yet to function in the manner envisaged. Such a stark reality necessitates a review of the ways in which we approach the establishment of security in Timor-Leste. By reducing SSR down to its elemental components, the previous chapter established three tiers of knowledge which are vital to the successful planning and implementation of the process: a true gauge of the ‘state of society’, a thorough assessment of the population’s needs within the context of human security, and comprehensive knowledge of the informal institutions in society that must be harnessed if successful formal institutions and a strong state are to emerge. The application of this framework to contemporary society and the security sector in Timor-Leste, described in Chapters 1 & 2, will provide new perspectives on the failings of SSR in this environment and propose ways in which the process could be reconsidered to enhance the chances of future success.

The State of East Timorese Society

The state of society should determine the prevailing political system, appropriate to the needs of a population and its modes of production and security. Subversion of local politics can leave people vulnerable and insecure, without familiar methods of risk management, which is contradictory to SSR’s stated aims.

Timor-Leste: An Agrarian Society?

Rod Nixon classifies Timor-Leste as a “new-subsistence state”; it contains some organisational attributes but not all, and has never had truly functioning formal structures (2008, pers. comm., 28 April). The moniker suggests some overlapping characteristics with Bates’s ‘agrarian society’ described in Chapter 3; this form of societal organisation is based around the private provision of violence through the kinship unit, which sees the sacrifice of prosperity in order to maintain peace (2001: 48).

The kinship unit in Timor-Leste remains a critical part of society, especially in rural areas, and is a vital source of protection. The most visible component of security is the marital traditions that dictate asymmetric relations between families of the bride and groom, ensuring the kinship network is extended with each union and providing strength in numbers. The importance of deterrence and a willingness to use violence, typical of agrarian relations, is evident in the acts of arson that have taken place since 1999 and family feuds that have boiled over into violence, such as those experienced by the Uatolafi people of Viqueque¹⁵ (Preston Pentony. 2008, pers. comm., 2 May).

The economic reality for much of East Timorese society also follows an agrarian trend. There is a tendency towards mitigating risk, conservatism, and a resultant poverty that precludes investment in technology or the enhancement of the population’s welfare (Bates, 2001). Diversity reduces the risk of crop failure, and the absence of a single major cash crop attests to the subsistence nature of foods produced. Furthermore, the large numbers of East Timorese (over 100,000) displaced from their homes through fear of violence or food insecurity is a startling demonstration of the threat starvation poses to the rural poor. For those that vacate their home areas there is a heavy reliance on the kinship unit as an insurance mechanism, with 70,000 of the total displaced residing with extended family members (International Crisis Group, 2008^b: i). The conservatism which impedes specialisation in the production of cash crops coupled with the demands of the kinship group on any surplus foodstuffs accounts for almost half of the population of Timor-Leste living on less than the calculated poverty line of \$0.55 per day. As there is no fixed land registration system through which legal ownership can act as capital for investment, very few resources exist to improve infrastructure and acquire technology that would make farming more efficient. However, the pay-off for the poverty endured in Timor-Leste is a strong kinship system that keeps many alive and provides relatively stable environment beyond the confines of Dili. These are classic hallmarks of the agrarian society.

¹⁵ Viqueque is one of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts (see Figure 1).

A Modern State

In contrast to the state of society, Timor-Leste's Constitution dictates a modern, proportionally represented democracy, complete with legislature and institutions commonly found in the Weberian state. In reality, Philipp Fluri remarks that there exist, at best, "proto-democratic structures" (2008, pers. comm., 16 April). Bates (2001) charts the rise of the modern democracy through the growth of urban areas, the rise of markets in these areas to which farmers could export surplus goods and the increasing expenditure families needed to protect their burgeoning wealth. The emergence of a neutral state and its monopoly over the use of force came about through its ability to reduce the cost of protecting assets. The state provided the force to protect private property in return for taxes that were spent on violence and other service provision. By contrast, Timor-Leste has only experienced rapid urban growth in Dili, and this has been largely encouraged by food aid and international aid workers creating a lucrative market. The population do not pay for the neutral arbitration of conflict, as they cannot afford to, and few have any assets worth protecting. The state is not accountable to its people as it does not rely on their contributions for tools of violence, and without such oversight it can consequently end up a threat rather than ensuring the balance of society.

An example of the modern state's incompatibility with an agrarian society can be found in the subversion of elections at a local level by family loyalties and traditional customs. This phenomenon of introducing internationally backed formal institutions without consideration of existing informal structures is labelled the "Transplant Effect", mentioned in Chapter 3 (Sindzingre & Stein, 2002: 9). Local elections are particularly susceptible as they determine access to resources and a balance of power that can directly affect ordinary people's lives. The first *Chefe de Suco* (village) elections were held in 2005, with 80% of the positions going to FRETILIN affiliated candidates (USAID, 2006: 7). However, parties were not based upon ideological conviction; rather they tapped into family allegiances and defined themselves against others (Preston Pentony. 2008, pers. comm., 2 May). The custom of political leaders having spiritual endorsement and originating from 'royal' families also influenced voting patterns, as a good percentage of those elected were *liurai* (kings) under the indigenous system and retained the support of elders (Mark Harris. 2008, pers. comm., 8 May). Although the semblance of the modern state exists through elections, democratic structures are somewhat irrelevant as they are not sympathetic to prevailing traditional priorities. The family and satisfaction of ancestral demands come first rendering strictly formal structures less effective.


Threats According to the East Timorese

Although the scale and logistics of this study did not allow for a comprehensive survey of the population (Appendix A), the majority of issues discussed in this sub-section were identified by the citizens of Timor-Leste and expanded upon by elite Timorese and international actors. It is important to understand the threats perceived by ordinary people primarily because they are at the core of the human security paradigm. Secondly, in order to establish the security upon which development can be built, an accurate assessment of threats is crucial. If it is vital that solutions to security problems are to be locally owned, then it is critical that identification of threats should also come from indigenous sources; only through addressing the most prominent fears of ordinary East Timorese will peace prevail. Formation and reform of the security sector should be responsive to feedback from the population. However, human security criteria are likely to identify threats that cannot be addressed be through an SSR programme. In such instances the reform of security institutions might have to assume a less prominent role.

The Nature and Geography of Threats

The varied nature of the threats identified by the East Timorese is an indication of the complexity of the situation. In response to the question “What keeps you awake at night?” a small number of interviewees in Bobonaro and Viqueque districts produced an array of responses, as shown below:

Figure 7 - Security Concerns of People in Bobonaro and Viqueque Districts



An interesting feature of these responses is the wide spectrum of worries, from classic fear of violence, through doubts over food, to the other extreme of those recently established institutions mandated to protect the population. A further point to highlight is the lack of a single dominant fear amongst those interviewed; this suggests that the threats differ between individuals, and perceptions are conditioned by personal circumstance. It is worth noting out that this survey was conducted using a limited sample concentrated in two small areas. A study of the dominant threats according to region was also carried out in the form of meetings with local civil society groups. The content of discussions varied considerably between districts, a broad indication of which is illustrated in Figure 8:

Figure 8 - Dominant Security Concerns by District (Source: The Author)



Throughout the country there is genuine concern over the lack of professionalism shown by the security forces, which is rooted in the events of 2006 and local incidents. This was interspersed with frequent criticism of the security arrangements that failed to prevent the shooting of President Ramos-Horta, with particular bile reserved for the perceived inaction of the international security apparatus. Of greater significance is the varied nature of discussions in those districts furthest from Dili. Lautém, Cova Lima and Oecussi all placed far greater emphasis on inadequacies of infrastructure, the actions of aid agencies and elements of human security rather than simply physical security. The divergence of priorities for outlying districts could be attributed to genuinely poorer provision of assistance and infrastructure further away from Dili. Alternatively people

residing away from the troubled districts of Dili, Ermera and Bobonaro might not have immediate physical security to worry about, and instead concentrate their attention elsewhere. Either way, it is clear the satisfaction of immediate concerns involves shifting priorities depending on geographical location. In order to have a clearer idea of the threats identified and the needs of the population it is worth examining the data in more detail.

Security Forces

The rushed nature in which both security forces were established led to fears over inadequacies in the training regimen to which new recruits were subjected, and to some extent these concerns seem well founded. There were numerous anecdotes of PNTL and F-FDTL abuses of power, such as the police turning up to a party uninvited and threatening people with their weapons, leaving local inhabitants traumatised and scared (Outreach Focus Group, Oecusse. 2008, pers. comm., 9 May). The response of government and international agencies by and large is to take the easy option and make the forces more robust, which some see as only exacerbating an already delicate situation (Preston Pentony. 2008. 2008, pers. comm., 2 May). A further criticism of the PNTL in particular is their illegitimate role in influencing the outcome of elections. During focus group discussions in Oecusse, Baucau and Viqueque, allusions were made to the partisan role of the police in local politics, with members of civil society describing the holding up of banners and use of vocal support to promote political parties (Outreach Focus Group, Viqueque. 2008, pers. comm., 16 April).

Weak Local Economy and Unemployment

The small monetary economy in Timor-Leste is felt by people in both rural and urban areas. Ordinary East Timorese farmers have complained of social envy of those unable to find jobs in the fields; this envy can boil over into jealousy and anger towards those with employment (Jefferson Soares. 2008, pers. comm., 28 April). Urban areas often suffer as a result of rural unemployment, having to accommodate the influx of unemployed youths, as described in Chapter 1. Competition for jobs in Dili does seem to be a major threat; one young student residing in Dili and working to earn tuition fees remarked, “The Government must ensure employment. There are enough or even too many police” (“Seco”. 2008, pers. comm., 22 April).

Land

The weakness of the economy and widespread unemployment is in some part caused by the pressure on land and lack of a land registration system. Some rate the land situation in Timor-Leste

as the most harmful threat facing society today. Rod Nixon points out that 95% of land remains under customary administration, and from a similar position it took Fiji 99 years to carry out a full registry (2008, pers. comm., 28 April). To complicate matters further the competition for land will only increase. In 2008 there are 60 persons per km², however, calculated according to present fertility rates this number is expected to jump to 123 persons per km² by 2018 (*Ibid*). Nixon estimates from numerous interviews with Suco leaders that 50% of disputes resolved at a local level revolve around land, causing concern that this figure will only increase along with competition (*Ibid*). The lack of a land registration system can also be seen as a major contributor to the continuing presence of IDPs, who are unable to invest in building up a property or business without assurance that their property will be upheld as legitimate (Colin Stewart. 2008, pers. comm., 15 April). The ongoing tensions over land make cleavages in society especially combustible; the head of a local NGO promoting dialogue remarked that although certain areas seem calm, there is an undercurrent of ill-feeling that can be triggered at any point. This is the case for Lautém district, where divisions between the Makasae and the Fataluko are not manifesting themselves through violence, but can at best be described as dormant (Joao Boavida. 2008, pers. comm., 7 May).

Political Violence

The majority of the civil society outreach programme was conducted prior to the surrender of rebels that had brought about violence in the west of the country. Without exception, the status of the rebels and efforts to apprehend them were inquired about, and many expressed fear that the fighting could spread into their area. The surrender of Gastao Salsinha (Appendix G) in late April nullified most concerns over this situation; nevertheless, other forms of political violence still remain, especially surrounding elections. Several interviewees remarked that there was a level of dissatisfaction with the extent of the freedoms newly introduced human rights were permitting (Susana Barnes. 2008, pers. comm., 29 April). “Josh” Trindade took this a step further when stating, “Free speech is foreign, not a part of society”; he argues leaders are required to set an example for the East Timorese population, but clashes at national level and a lack of respect leads people away from traditional values towards conflict and the power of the gun (2008, pers. comm., 14 April). The possible negative ramifications of human rights are a discussion for elsewhere, but it remains true that during elections there is widespread violence (Appendix D). A case in point was found in Viqueque during parliamentary elections, where political parties and the police commissioner were implicated in a series of arson attacks (Sophia Cason. 2008, pers. comm., 26 April).

Welfare of Women

The conditions for women in Timor-Leste were a frequent concern for East Timorese asked about security worries. The majority of assault cases in the judicial system are domestic violence (Rita Reddy. 2008, pers. comm., 16 April), and women in Oecusse and Lautém both expressed concerns at the number of cases with which they were coming into contact (Outreach Focus Group, Lautém. 2008, pers. comm., 9 April; Outreach Focus group, Oecusse. 2008, pers. comm., 9 May). There is also inadequate provision for childbirth, with some women in Oecusse residing in mortal danger as there is only one ambulance, contributing to a national maternal mortality rate of 800 per 100,000 live births (UNDP, 2006: 2).

Infrastructure

Inadequate facilities can also be seen as a fundamental threat to livelihoods and survival. A focus group meeting in Lautém revolved significantly around the lack of communication facilities that would ameliorate the flow of information, and the absence of electricity, which would allow the working day to be extended after dark and facilitate the use of electronic devices (Outreach Focus Group, Lautém. 2008, pers. comm., 9 April). Furthermore, the state of the road systems creates an added difficulty, with Rod Nixon highlighting it as the main obstacle to self-sufficiency in Timor-Leste (2008, pers. comm., 28 April).

Perceived Threats within a Human Security Context

The threats outlined above are numerous and varied, and indicate that many aspects of Human Security are not provided for. Although there is evident concern regarding personal security, issues such as land, the economy, infrastructure and violence against women fall into categories like economic, environmental and community security. The security sector itself is part of the problem and this leaves obvious room for reform; but many concerns of the population are under the jurisdiction of other areas of government and must be addressed by the appropriate organ. There is certainly a role for reform of the security sector in establishing security and peace as a prerequisite to development, however, SSR programmes must be responsive to the needs of the population. As a result SSR might be less instrumental in the establishment of security than is currently envisaged. This could have a practical impact on initiatives such as the Government led *Hamatuk Hari'i Futuru* (National Recovery Strategy). Consisting of five main pillars encompassing the return of IDPs, improvement of livelihood opportunities and social protection, the majority of funding has been directed towards strengthening the *Estabilidad* (Security) pillar (RDTL, *Hamutuk Hari'i Futuru*:

Retreat Outcomes. 2008, pers. comm., 28 February). In attempting to strengthen security forces to improve security, the Government is neglecting underlying problems which could resurface at any point (Bryant Castro. 2008, pers. comm., 22 April). Greater adherence to the demands of the population would prompt a reconfiguration of funding priorities and ensure these issues received more attention.


The Formation of Institutions in Timor-Leste

The third area of focus is the manner in which institutions are formed and reformed. It is this element that would derive the greatest benefit from a clearer distinction between ‘reform’ and ‘reconstruction’. ‘Reconstruction’ is a discipline apart as it requires a sympathetic knowledge of culture and informal practices, in order that the institutions created are in some part endogenous and recognisable to the population. The blurred line of distinction between ‘reform’ and ‘reconstruction’ can leave internationals that are familiar with functioning institutions in developed nations, in charge of helping create institutions that address a fundamentally different environment made up of alien structures.

Perceptions of Actors Involved in SSR


The attitudes and preconceptions of SSR practitioners and those associated with the process are crucial to the nature and shape of a programme. Twenty in-depth qualitative interviews were carried out in Timor-Leste as part of this study (Appendix A), and attitudes towards traditional culture and informal institutions can be sorted into three broad categories: positive, negative and indiscernible.

Figure 9 – Attitudes of Qualitative Interviewees towards Culture and Informal Institutions




There was almost an equal split between those that showed a willingness to embrace the culture and societal structures detailed in Chapter 1 and those that displayed noticeable scepticism. This split remained even when an extra distinction between national and international interviewees was introduced:

Figure 10 - A Comparison of National and International Attitudes towards Culture and Informal Structures



Only when the professional background of international participants was introduced as a variable did a clear trend of attitudes emerge:

Figure 11 - The Influence of National and Professional Background on Attitudes towards Culture and Informal Structures



The majority of ‘other international’ interviewees were employed by UN agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or local NGOs. There is no conclusive explanation for the split in feeling. A line of reasoning could be that staff at the DPKO is actually responsible for the practicalities of UN involvement in SSR, which has led to a certain amount of pragmatism regarding local structures. Alternatively, DPKO staff has traditionally been drawn from people qualified to undertake peacekeeping operations, and many have not been exposed to significant developmental training, which places specific focus on the importance of working alongside the local environment. Whatever the reasoning, Figure 11 might account for the strong focus on establishing formal institutions that has been a feature of the SSR effort in Timor-Leste.


The concerns of international aid workers regarding local structures range from the violation of non-negotiable core democratic values (SRSG Atul Khare. 2008, pers. comm., 6 May) and the patriarchal nature of some traditions (Rita Reddy. 2008, pers. comm., 16 April), to the inherent violence that some see in societal structures (Mark Harris. 2008, pers. comm., 8 May). Interestingly, many interviewees referred to a disconnect between the East Timorese elite and traditional customs, which could also help explain the shape of SSR efforts to date. Many of the political elites in charge of Timor-Leste since independence were part of a group named “Assimilados”, who were ‘civilised’ and assimilated into Portuguese culture. On return from exile after the Popular Consultation they set about attempting to modernise the state (Rod Nixon. 2008, pers. comm., 28 April). As the main national interlocutors, they vigorously embraced a modern central state and took measures to sideline undemocratic leaders, such as the 2005 Suco elections (Joao Boavida. 2008, pers. comm., 7 May). Consequently, political elites are accused of being concentrated in Dili, out of touch with the general feeling in the country, and too readily dismissive of tradition (Jose “Josh” Trindade. 2008, pers. comm., 14 April).

Informal Institutions

Over the past decade “New Institutionalism” has stressed the influence of informal customs and beliefs on the functioning of codified institutions. The defining characteristics of an informal institution, advanced in Chapter 3, feature “socially shared rules” and operation outside of “officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). “Josh” Trindade (2008) provides strong evidence to suggest the informal elements of East Timorese society wield significant influence over the performance of formal institutions. He acknowledges the chances of instability are reduced with the removal of concerns over health, unemployment and political violence, but argues that in the absence of identifiably East Timorese foundations, the state will be perpetually vulnerable to

collapse; “This foundation must be based on East Timorese culture, traditions and worldview” (Trindade, 2008: 36). Figure 12 is an illustration of the ideal East Timorese state according to Trindade, with the emphasis placed upon a core of national values and the incorporation of indigenous structures into the make-up of the state:

Figure 12 - Trindade's Ideal East Timorese State (2008: 28)



As a core element of the central state, the security sector is not exempt from this thesis. The justice system in particular would benefit from recognisable symbols and values, especially in its attempts to gain the trust of the population. Indigenous elements are also important in ensuring the system is tailored to East Timorese society and able to function. The processing of crimes that require delicate cultural understanding and crimes not dealt with in developed penal systems are best addressed by local authorities. The meaning of “rape” in the context of Timor-Leste can often be misunderstood by internationals who have preconceptions surrounding the word. It can be used to describe non-consensual sexual assault, as in the western understanding, but can also be applied to consensual sexual relations outside of matrimony that do not lead to marriage (Outreach Focus Group, Oecusse).

2008, pers. comm., 9 May). In case of the latter, compensation must be paid under East Timorese values in recognition of the violation of the woman and to restore the balance of society. However, no crime has been committed according to any Western penal code and therefore such a case should be dealt with by a local tribunal rather than a criminal court. The failure to harness traditional structures for dealing with cases at a very local level contributes to the significant¹⁶ backlog faced by the inadequately staffed and overwhelmed formal justice system.

Hybrid Political Structures

The success of reconstruction efforts in particular could hinge on the capacity of formal institutions to work alongside their informal counterparts. There is little doubt that some of the sceptics' perceptions of traditional structures are based on reality; they are largely undemocratic, patriarchal and can sometimes encourage retaliatory justice (Mark Harris. 2008, pers. comm., 8 May). However, the benefits of informal institutions filling gaps in the state's provision are encouraged by Lauth (2000), who reasons they provide regulation to sections of society where no formal rules have applied. The acceptance and regulation of traditional structures would also provide a useful avenue for reform; every society is dynamic and informal customs and rules are constantly adapting to an ever changing reality. Traditional culture has already proved it can adapt and work alongside formal institutions. Catholicism has been rationalised and accepted, to the point where Priests join in with local ceremonies and customary leaders help out at Easter and Passover services (Rod Nixon. 2008, pers. comm., 28 April). Similarly, a growing trend has been noted of the PNTL attending local ceremonies in order to observe and provide legitimacy (Mark Harris. 2008, pers. comm., 8 May). A hybrid state is a possibility, as long as tradition is treated with respect; several interviewees mentioned a ritual carried out outside the Palacio de Governo in 2006, which was under-researched and involved the wrong elders, alienating influential traditional figures (Bryant Castro. 2008, pers. comm., 22 April; Rebecca Engels. 2008, pers. comm., 7 May).

An Unofficial Hybrid State

In reality a hybrid state already exists, although unofficially. Despite inadequate training, nepotism and ill discipline, Ed Rees identifies the inability to file forms and a lack of mobility as the two major obstacles to an effective police force (2008, pers. comm., 2 May). In most districts there are the numbers of police needed to oversee peaceful environments (between 1 and 4 per 1000 people); the US army estimates the ideal ratio of police to population in "strife-torn countries" to be

¹⁶ Currently thought to stand at around 4000 cases (Rita Reddy. 2008, pers. comm., 16 April)

much higher, between 13.26 and 20 per 1000 inhabitants (Broemmel, Clark, & Nielsen, 2007). Although there is limited violence reported in districts outside of Dili, police numbers are at the lower end of the recommended spectrum (see Table 1).

Table 1 - Police Figures by District in Timor-Leste (UNPol, *National Operations Centre Presentation to DPKO*. 2008, pers. comm., 29 April)


DISTRICT	No. of UNPol	No. of PNTL	RATIO - PNTL:POPULATION	No. Of UNPol VEHICLES
Aileu	25	90	1:274	9
Ainaro	20	110	1:486	9
Baucau	34	179	1:632	17
Bobonaro	31	132	1:624	12
Cova Lima	30	134	1:220	N/A
Dili	262	510	N/A	121
Ermera	31	142	1:710	16
Lautém	33	154	1:390	10
Liquiça	27	108	1:503	10
Manatuto	31	110	1:332	11
Manufaho	26	111	1:416	N/A
Oecusse	22	120	1:476	9
Viqueque	34	145	1:452	14

The capacity of the PNTL and UNPol to police areas under their jurisdiction is further hindered by small numbers of vehicles at their disposal and limited allocations of fuel. The PNTL in particular are affected by restrictions on equipment. Although police vehicle figures by district were unavailable at the time of research, Lautém district was reported to contain an automobile for the PNTL District Commissioner and a motorbike for his/her deputy, both carrying strict fuel rations (Munir Hossen. 2008, pers. comm., 9 April). There are also limited communications facilities, as the area does not have full radio coverage and the PNTL are not able to provide a radio to every officer on duty. This would appear to be a country-wide problem as no centralised reporting mechanisms for the districts or central crime records exist (David Cahill. 2008, pers. comm., 29 April). For a population of

approximately 60,575 in Lautém (UNPOL, *Lautém Fact Sheet*. 2008, pers. comm., 28 February), the small numbers of police, lack of transport and limited communications lead to constraints on the policing they receive, and in particular the responsiveness of the PNTL to crimes requiring immediate attention.

Crime statistics that UNPol has managed to compile on a national level suggest the difficulties experienced by the PNTL in Lautém are present across the country. Only specific crimes, deemed too serious to address elsewhere, are reported to the police:

Figure 13- Crimes Reported to the Police Jan 2007-Feb 2008 (UNPol, National Operations Centre Presentation to DPKO. 2008, pers. comm., 29 April)



The large number of assaults and comparatively high reporting of arson attacks is representative of the seriousness in which both crimes are held by local and national authorities. The low incidence of other crimes is either due to minimal crime rates in Timor-Leste, or people resorting to other authorities in cases where the police response may be too slow or unable to resolve the incident satisfactorily. It seems the latter may be true as a similar trend was reported in 2003; in a report on the interface between traditional and formal systems of justice (Hohe & Nixon, 2003), a CivPol (now UNPol) officer described the difficulties that were present:

Resources were always extremely limited, the main factor was personnel. And there are only 24 hours in a day. Realistically, we had to ‘offload’ the majority of matters to a traditional resolution because we didn’t have time or manpower to deal with all offences in a formal way (Hohe & Nixon, 2003: 33)

Added to the lack of a functioning court system, there are great incentives to defer to traditional mechanisms. The result is an unofficial hybrid state, with formal institutions performing below their capacity and, in rural areas, the informal sector playing an influential role with little state regulation.

The Importance of Informal Institutions to Legitimacy

Ultimately Weberian institutions only function as envisaged if they achieve legitimacy through common acceptance of the values they stand for; adherence to rules through expediency (e.g. only to avoid punishment) will not produce a sustainable democratic state (Weber, 1964). Local ownership, through familiar symbols and customs, is essential for gaining a population’s trust; the minimal formal recognition of the traditional sector that exists in Timor-Leste means that state institutions can appear remote, especially to the uneducated rural poor who have little contact with urban areas. Legitimacy is also achieved through the smooth functioning of state provisions. Bates (2001) makes the argument that the switch from private to public provision of violence incentivised by the speed with which neutral arbiters reach decisions. The court system in Timor-Leste is providing these incentives in reverse, with no guarantee of quick resolution to disputes. A focus group in Oecusse voted by show of hands that the majority would prefer to go through the formal system where possible, but most people use traditional conflict resolution measures due to the inadequacy of formal structures (Outreach Focus Group, Oecusse. 2008, pers. comm., 9 May). The tendency for SSR in Timor-Leste to eschew recognition of informal structures is ironically pushing the population towards informal mechanisms, as the workload for formal equivalents is too great. This oversight could also have longer lasting effect on the formal sector, as the malfunctioning and exploitation of democratic institutions might come to be seen as true democratic practice (Lauth, 2000). In order for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘reform’ programmes to produce institutions that achieve widespread legitimacy and serve the needs of the population, rigid adherence to the Western model of the democratic state will have to be relaxed. SSR theorists and practitioners must be prepared to understand and respect cultural symbols and practices, and look to harness them to work in tandem with more widely recognisable security structures.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Security is a constitutive pillar of development and a prerequisite to the development process. Development is unlikely to take place if people are preoccupied with securing their rudimentary safety from internal conflict or high levels of crime. SSR must look to enhance the immediate provision of security in environments where it is lacking, and also put in place foundations for the evolution of the security sector into a dependable and apolitical arm of a modern democratic state.

Literature addressing SSR has grown at a rapid rate and acknowledges the importance of security in less developed environments. SSR is now commonly prescribed as a developmental tool. It adopts a holistic definition of the security sector in order that a thorough knowledge of security providers and threats can aid effective coordination of reform. Reform efforts centre on the individual and are broadly aimed at achieving human security and justice for the population. The sustainability of security is also a priority, through civilian oversight and accountability of the security sector, and building capacity within indigenous populations to carry out security reviews without international assistance.

In spite of desirable objectives, practitioners are struggling to translate theory into practice; the implications of human security emerging as the dominant definition of ‘security’ for SSR programmes remain blurred, and a “policy vacuum” (Hendrickson, 1999: 39) exists regarding how SSR can be best shaped to contribute to the development process. Common inadequacies of SSR programmes have become well documented and are proving difficult to overcome. The variety of different approaches employed by donor agencies creates a tangled and directionless web of initiatives. This lack of coordination is often to the detriment of indigenous actors whose participation is sacrificed in favour of quick tangible results. The outcome is frequently generic Western institutions recognisable only to the internationals that conceive them and unresponsive to the context in which they exist. Timor-Leste serves as a classic example of such inadequacies. The subversion of ill-conceived uniformed security institutions and impotency of judicial and democratic oversight mechanisms led to the 2006 crisis. Although initially hailed a success, the reconstruction of the security sector in Timor-Leste was hampered by an unrealistic timeframe placed upon the transitional UN administration. The rushed recruitment and inadequate training of security and judicial personnel left institutions that failed to serve the population and were vulnerable to politicisation by opportunistic actors.

A New Framework

The failings of SSR in Timor-Leste and elsewhere necessitate a re-examination of the concept in order to improve the implementation of theory. This paper has sought to provide a fresh approach to SSR through a review of its core theoretical components. The analysis of key discourses and acknowledgment of their implications relevant to the security sector has produced a three tier framework. Through the framework questions over the true nature of ‘security’ and the role of SSR in its provision can be answered in a practical and context-specific manner. The research suggests SSR must be approached from societal, human and institutional perspectives in order to obtain a detailed overview of a situation and produce a programme appropriate to the environment in which it will be carried out.

Societal

A true gauge of the ‘state of society’ is essential in order that SSR is sympathetic to the prevailing modes of production and security. Bates (2001) highlights the triangular relationship of politics, violence and production as a determinant of the developmental state of society. He stresses the progression of a society from living under agrarian rules to participating in the modern state is rational if not linear, and movement along the spectrum is triggered by change in the optimal arrangement of the triangle detailed above. SSR must seek to aid the progression of society and work with prevailing arrangements rather than attempting to recast the functioning of society overnight. In particular, it must resist drastically altering political arrangements dictating the organisation of violence and risk management mechanisms, which can leave ordinary people vulnerable. As a developmental tool SSR should act as a catalyst in the “transformation” (Stiglitz, 2003) of politics’ relations with violence and production, along the spectrum outlined by Bates, rather than advocating the immediate upheaval involved in the development as freedom thesis (Sen, 1999).

Human

The shift of developmental focus away from the state and onto the individual has seen the rise of human security as the dominant interpretation of ‘security’ in SSR. Security concerns under the seven categories of Human Security are best articulated by the people that face them; it is imperative that the greatest perceived threats of the population are given priority, in order that the temptation to revert to unauthorised violence and crime is removed. The prioritisation of threats should also determine the shape of SSR programmes; in the short-term SSR should seek to help

nullify threats where it can, however, some human security criteria, such as environmental and food, fall outside the direct influence of the security sector. Consequently, immediate security priorities might require that initial SSR activities are restricted as other needs are addressed, and to avoid the creation of new threats.

Institutional

The manner in which security institutions are reformed can significantly influence the prospects of success for SSR programmes. SSR professionals can display scepticism towards the capacity of informal structures outside of the Weberian state to deliver effective and impartial security. This is to some extent rooted in a tendency for SSR literature to propose reform and analyse mistakes in the language of the formal sector. Naturally, the formal sector demands significant attention, and particular emphasis must be placed on a holistic approach to the security sector translating into strong causal linkages between institutions. However, to function correctly formal institutions must retain legitimacy, which is largely determined by factors outside of codified rules.

Greater emphasis should be placed on the influence of informal institutions in the political arena. Informal customs can enhance or undermine the workings of formal institutions, and some informal structures are a substitute for the state where provision of services is inadequate. It is imperative in any SSR context that the informal sector is mapped, understood and harnessed where possible to give programmes the best chance of succeeding. Customary symbols and practices must be incorporated into SSR practice in order that reform of the formal sector produces institutions that garner widespread legitimacy amongst the population. Furthermore, recognition of informal structures at a local level can reduce the pressure on a malfunctioning formal sector. If SSR programmes are to succeed they will need to become more receptive to symbols and structures familiar to the indigenous environment.

Functional Analysis

The advantages of the framework described above are best illustrated by the fresh perspective it brings to the case study of Timor-Leste.

The organisation of production and continuing private provision of violence in Timor-Leste are typical traits of an agrarian society. They are regulated by kinship orientated politics which prioritises respect of elders, maintenance of honour and the balance of society. In this type of environment the framework of a modern state is left vulnerable to subversion as it does not address the needs of the

population. Instead, modern elements, such as the police, are dragged into kinship and factional politics. Greater subtlety and patience is required to transform society in a sustainable manner.

The variety of security problems and their geographical peculiarity is illustrative that blanket SSR, even within a country the size of Timor-Leste, is unlikely to effectively assuage a good proportion of security fears. Indeed, the geographical distribution of threats suggests that some areas may be better served by a reconsideration of funding to the NRS and prioritisation of pillars outside of *Hamutuk Hari'i Estabilidade* to provide much needed infrastructure and permanent solution to problems over land.

Finally, many formal institutions are not functioning as they should and the disproportionate concentration on the formal sector is harming the prospects for democracy in the future. Currently the worst of the both worlds exist in the form of an unofficial hybrid state; formal institutions are haemorrhaging trust as they fail to perform, while alternative structures remain unregulated and are in competition with the state, closing off channels for reform. A suitable point of interface between the informal and formal sectors needs to be found for three reasons: the pressure must be eased on formal institutions to allow development and avoid disappointment amongst the population; an acceptance of informal practices rooted in east Timorese society would begin to afford the state “grounded legitimacy” (Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2008); and through interaction the formal sector could regulate its informal counterpart and attempt reform in partnership with traditional leaders.

Recommendations

The framework outlined in this paper and its functional consequences lead to a number of recommendations for present and future SSR efforts, which could help the process to function in a more effective manner:

- 1) There is clear need for a comprehensive gathering of information on formal and informal structures in the country, prevalent cultural practices and security threats in the perception of the local population. A post-war situation could dictate that some of the information required to gauge the state of society and map the informal sector is acquired outside the environment in question. This can be obtained from regional specialists, anthropologists and the diaspora. However, there will need to be a large in-country assessment at an early stage to corroborate information gathered from abroad and to determine the prevalent threats to human security.

- 2) The processing of information on the state of society, the formal and informal sectors, and especially security threats must lead, in conjunction with national actors, to production of a roadmap. This should map out the proposed timetable for SSR over an agreed period of time, and justify decisions within a developmental context. The early timetabling of reform could allow for longer mandates and greater development of local capacity before it is required to administer the country without international assistance.
- 3) The personnel directly involved in the implementation of SSR must be recruited from a broader range of backgrounds, more appropriately apportioned to address the task in hand. The UN use of DPKO to administer SSR results in practitioners with training in peacekeeping activities implementing a developmental activity. A greater number of personnel with developmental and anthropological training are needed to cater for elements of reform programmes that require specific expertise. An example is the building and reform of institutions, which would be greatly aided by a thorough knowledge of the literature and prior experience.
- 4) To address the recommendation above, the UN might consider the establishment of an SSR unit within DPKO or the UNDP. This would allow the quick deployment of specially trained and efficient teams to carry out the tasks laid out in Recommendations 1 & 2. It would also help to establish best practice guidelines through feedback of personnel on their experiences, and ensure institutional memory of past failures.

Word Count: 19,876

Appendices

APPENDIX A: Research Methodology

The research for this paper was conducted between 16 March and 10 May during an internship with the Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) in Timor-Leste.¹⁷ Data was mainly gathered using qualitative interviewing techniques, although some quantitative data was obtained from alternative sources and analysed by the author. Qualitative techniques included semi-structured and unstructured interviews, observation and focus group discussions.

Semi-structured & Unstructured Interviews

Qualitative interviews were initially carried out according to a check-list (Appendix C) in a semi-structured format¹⁸; however, due to the high level and extensive knowledge of certain interviewees, the interviews were occasionally allowed to evolve into an unstructured format¹⁹ so as to permit the subject to direct conversation towards topics that might be of relevance. Robson notes, “Face to face interviews offer the possibility of modifying one’s line of enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating underlying motives in a way that postal and other self-administered questionnaires cannot” (1993; 229). This flexibility of this technique was also especially useful in responding to interview opportunities at short notice, as many interviewees were extremely busy and could not commit in advance.

Twenty extensive semi-structured and structured interviews took place during the research and a further ten shorter structured interviews were carried out with members of the general public. Before each interview the subjects were informed of the author’s academic purpose, the limited audience for the research and were given the option of anonymity. No incentives or gifts were offered to any of the interviewees, although one national did subsequently seek advice on study abroad. Trust is central to the effective gathering of data (Barakat, 2004) and many interviews were conducted with subjects who were colleagues and had known the author for an extended period of time. Consequently, some interviews were candid and proved extremely useful. Interviewees were

¹⁷ The SSSU is part of the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT); however, the author was registered as a member of the UNDP for administrative purposes.

¹⁸ A format in which “the interviewer has worked out a set of questions in advance, but is free to modify their order based upon his/her perception of what seems most appropriate in the context of the ‘conversation’” (Dr A. Özerdem. 2007, pers. comm., 27 November).

¹⁹ “Where the interviewer has a general area of interest or concern, but lets the conversation develop within this area” (Dr A. Özerdem. 2007, pers. comm., 27 November).

mainly identified through association with the UN or connections within the international community in Dili. Some national subjects were approached at random or on recommendation of colleagues, and the ten shorter interviews were conducted as part of UN public information initiatives.

Focus Groups

Focus group meetings were conducted as part of an SSSU outreach programme, aimed at giving civil society groups outside of Dili the chance to interrogate Unit members on policy areas and feed in concerns to the system. The focus of the discussions was ‘security’ and a short introductory presentation on the SSSU’s activities preceded the discussion on most occasions. For the most part the meeting would follow the direction provided by attendees’ questions and comments. The author was present at eight focus group meetings in seven separate locations²⁰, and was permitted to pose questions and contribute to the discussion on most occasions.

Limitations on time and the meetings’ focus on civil society’s concerns precluded the use of Rapid Rural Appraisal techniques; nevertheless, the focus groups proved conducive to forthright opinion and constructive suggestions on the part of civil society actors. The frank nature of discussion was highlighted by criticism of the UN and other international actors, complaints over the conduct of Government and frequent concerns aired regarding about the actions of the PNTL and F-FDTL.

Survey

Opportunities to carry out quantitative data gathering techniques were limited by time, a lack contact with appropriate subjects and availability of translation facilities. Only one survey was carried out, in conjunction with the UN Public Information Office. It posed the question, ‘What Keeps you awake at night?’ to eleven subjects who were encouraged to provide short, concise answers.

Observation

Observation is a useful technique with which to supplement qualitative data, as it is “often the least obtrusive way to test conclusions suggested by qualitative investigation” (Barakat, 2004: 198). Observations were recorded according to the ‘narrative’ method set out by Spradely (quoted in Silverman, 2001: 227); this involved short notes being made in the situation, and soon after

²⁰ Oecusse (x2), Liquiça, Cova Lima, Bobonaro, Baucau, Viqueque and Lautém.

expanded upon. Observation proved particularly useful in understanding the squalor of IDP camps in Dili, gauging the level of infrastructure, such as road and electricity, in different areas of the country and understanding the levels of poverty in areas outside of Dili. Traditional biases, such as “selective attention” and “selective memory” (Robson, 1993: 204), were an influence as many observations took place while working or carrying out other methods of research, which acted as distractions.

Police Data Analysis

Analysis of police data was used to obtain an alternative perspective to qualitative reports on dominant methods of conflict resolution used by the population of Timor-Leste. Through examination of capacity and the crimes dealt with by the PNTL and UNPol, a clearer picture emerged of the services available and the instances in which they were used. The research, carried out over a day spent at the PNTL headquarters in Dili, was largely based on internal factsheets maintained by PNTL and UNPol and a presentation made by members of UNPol to the wider UN mission during the author’s stay.

General Biases and Triangulation

There are some biases that were unavoidable during the undertaking of this research and need to be acknowledged when assessing the findings. Despite a reasonable timeframe for research, the eight week period spent in Timor-Leste was primarily an internship with a full work schedule, and the opportunities for data collection were subject to other commitments. Furthermore, the authors’ travel was restricted by a limited transport system and UN security regulations that required permission to be given for movement outside of Dili. The timing of the visit outside of the ‘lean season’ also added to a definite urban and seasonal bias, which could jeopardise the generalisability of results obtained.

There were also biases linked to the author’s affiliation with UNMIT. Some interviewees embedded within the mission felt the need to defend the record and contemporary actions of the UN in the face of widespread negativity emanating from the Government and bilateral partners. Conversely, international actors outside of the UN mission were undoubtedly influenced by the prevailing perception that SSR had been a failure, and at times organisational competition compromised objectivity in acknowledging a unique and complex situation. UNMIT’s convening of focus group discussions could also have had an impact on discussions held; the Dili-centric nature of the UN presence and ambiguity over the definition of ‘security’ might have encouraged participants to focus on national level politics.

The translation unit within UNMIT was relatively small and under huge strain from their workload; this precluded the possibility of individual interviews with Tetun-speaking East Timorese outside of a UN remit. Interviews with non-English speaking East Timorese were restricted to official UN projects in which this demographic was involved. This created a bias towards English-speaking national and international actors (see Appendix B), which were almost without exception drawn from an elite background. However, any translation of East Timorese input was carried out by translators trained by the UN and therefore a minimal bias existed from the transition of opinions between languages.

The shortfall in direct East Timorese contribution to the research has been negated by triangulation using a multi-method approach. All the research techniques described address the same subject from different perspectives allowing comparison and contrast of results (Denscombe, 2003). Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions form the backbone of the analysis, but this is verified by findings from the survey, police data analysis and observation.

APPENDIX B: List of Interviewees

Name	Location	Description
UNMIT		
David Cahill	Dili	Chief, National Operations Centre (UNPol)
Mark Harris	Dili	Political Affairs Department
Atul Khare	Dili	Special Representative of the Security General (SRSG) and Head of UNMIT
Murad Mohammed	Dili	Joint-Mission Assessment Centre (UNPol)
MD Munir Hossen	Lospalos	District Commissioner for UNPol in Lautém
Preston Pentony	Dili	Political Affairs Department
Rita Reddy	Dili	Senior Gender Advisor
Colin Stewart	Dili	Chief of Staff and Head of Political Affairs Unit
Other International		
Susana Barnes	Dili	Anthropologist commissioned to research in Timor-Leste by the Australian National University (ANU)
Sophia Cason	Dili	UNDP advisor to the Ministry of Social Solidarity
Bryant Castro	Dili	Employee of International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
James Dunne	Dili	Author and Expert on Timor-Leste


Rebecca Engels	Dili	Employee of Belun (a local NGO)
Dr. Philipp Fluri	Dili	Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Executive Director of DCAF Brussels
Ben Lark	Dili	UNDP advisor to the Ministry of Social Solidarity
Rod Nixon	Dili	Academic and specialist on Timor-Leste
Ed Rees	Dili	SSR specialist and expert on Timor-Leste
Elite East Timorese		
Joao Boavida	Dili	Director, The Peace and Democracy Foundation
"Seco"	Dili	Young East Timorese student
Jose "Josh" Trindade	Dili	Academic and expert on East Timorese culture
Ordinary East Timorese		
Fernanda Pereira	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Domingos Martins	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Rince Nipu	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Martinu Bilimau	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Jeferino Soares	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Horasio dos Santos	Maliana	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Duarte Da Costa	Viqueque	Citizen of Timor-Leste

"Vitoria"	Viqueque	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Angelo da Cruz	Viqueque	Citizen of Timor-Leste
Dulce Ximenes	Viqueque	Citizen of Timor-Leste


APPENDIX C: Checklist for Semi-Structured Interviews

1. What is the interviewee's knowledge of informal structures and East Timorese culture?
2. What are the interviewee's thoughts on informal structures and culture
3. How are the police performing and what role do the informal structures play in policing and conflict resolution?
4. What are the views on the SSR programme to date?
5. Where do the failings lie?
6. What are the main problems the PNTL, F-FDTL and Judiciary face?
7. What should Government priorities be?
8. How should the international community be contributing to the developmental process in Timor-Leste?

Appendix D: Timeline - The UN in Timor-Leste




APPENDIX E: Map of Violence during 2007 Parliamentary Elections



(Source: Geographic Information System, UNMIT. 2008, pers. comm., 2 May)

**APPENDIX F: Timor-Leste Projected Petroleum Revenue Profile,
1999-2041 (US Dollars)**



APPENDIX G: Actors involved in the Security Sector

PNTL						
Partner Country/ Institution	Activity Description	Beneficiary	Cost (US\$ unless stated)	Status	Start Date	End Date
<u>Operational</u>						
UNPOL	Operational Control and Executive Authority over PNTL	PNTL		Ongoing	2006	Unknown
PNTL/UNPOL	Enhanced Co-location: Improved logistics for collocation of UNPOL and PNTL officers to facilitate institutional capacity building. Includes building of new spaces to accommodate arrangement.	PNTL		Planning	2008	Unknown
<u>Infrastructure</u>						
PNTL	Construction of new police stations and houses across the country. Are these individual houses or more 'barracks'-style arrangements?	PNTL	\$2 million <i>(Is this from the national budget?)</i>	Planning	2008	Unknown

<u>Capacity Building</u>						
Australian Federal Police	Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP): Police reform practical level in crime prevention and community safety, investigations and operations, training and police service, including administration oversight and strategy. Includes 5 advisors dedicated to PNTL	Primary: PNTL Secondary: Ministry of Security	Aus \$32 million	Ongoing	Jun-04	Jun-08
Cuba	Medical Training of 4 PNTL personnel in Cuba.	PNTL		Ongoing	2006	Unknown
Mozambique	Police Training for 5 agents in Mozambique.	PNTL		Ongoing	2006	Unknown
<u>Principal:</u> Prosecutor <u>General Support:</u> UNDP/UNPO L/Government of Japan	Basic Textbook: Textbook including the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Law.	PNTL	\$35,004	Completed	Aug-07	Jan-08
Malaysia	Advanced Individual Training. Further information required on location, duration, numbers involved and substance.	PNTL		Ongoing	2007	

RDTL/PNTL/ UNPol (GNR)	Creation PNTL Taskforce: Creation of new police unit. Based in Dili but with cross-country capacity. Initial training UNPol (GNR). Equipment supplied by the Government.	PNTL		Ongoing	2007	
PNTL	Budgetary Workshops: Weekly workshop on budget planning for PNTL. Attended by Top commanders and intended for policy formation.	PNTL		Completed	2007	
UNPOL	Training for PNTL: 4-6 month training programme to serve as basic training after certification. Includes Human Rights training, leadership, management courses and investigation techniques.	PNTL		Frozen	2007	Unknown
PNTL	Organisational Workshops: Weekly workshops on organisation for PNTL. Attended by top commanders intended for policy formation.	PNTL		Ongoing	2008	Unknown
UNPOL	Legislative Review and Advisory Unit: 2 advisors in position.	PNTL		Ongoing		
Indonesia	Training of PNTL at staff college <i>Is this in T-L, how long for and how many people involved?</i>	PNTL/F-FDTL		Imminent	2008	
UNPOL/PNTL	Handover of police stations: Handover of three police stations from UNPOL to PNTL control.	PNTL		Completed	2008	
Asia Foundation	Community Policing: Training in Dili and elsewhere in community policing. Expansion predicted as project progresses	PNTL	\$1.6 million	Fundraising for expansion underway	2008	2009
Equipment						

<u>Principal:</u> Australia <u>Support:</u> Portugal/Japan? Is this one initiative with three countries involved or three projects supporting one area?	Pacific Patrol Boat Programme: Provision of a boat and training of crew for entry into Pacific Class Patrol Boat programme. Training to take place in Tasmania. First Blue water equipment Timor-Leste will possess. Will include fisheries protection, maritime surveillance etc.	F-FDTL/PNTL maritime personnel		Imminent	Mid-08	Unknown
Policy						
<u>Principal:</u> Secretary of State for Security (SSS) <u>Support:</u> UNPOL	Assessment of PNTL and drafting of Strategic Plan for Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding (RRR Plan): On basis of assessment draft plan to reconstitute PNTL	PNTL/SSS	N/A	Ongoing	Jan-07	Dec-08
Monitoring						
JSMP-LRU	Police Monitoring: To guarantee the rights of all citizens and detainees in Timor-Leste.	PNTL	Unfunded	Ongoing		

Secretary of State for Security

Partner Country/ Institution	Activity Description	Beneficiary	Cost (US\$ unless stated)	Status	Start Date	End Date
<u>Capacity Building</u>						
Australian Federal Police	Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP): Police reform at both oversight and practical level. Includes 3 advisors positioned with SSS	Primary: PNTL Secondary: Ministry of Security		Ongoing		
<u>Policy</u>						
<u>Principal:</u> Secretary of State for Security (SSS) <u>Support:</u> UNPOL	Assessment of PNTL and drafting of Strategic Plan for Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding (RRR Plan): On basis of assessment draft plan to reconstitute PNTL. Includes 2 advisors stationed in the office of SSS.	PNTL/SSS	N/A	Ongoing	Jan-07	Dec-08
<u>Lead:</u> Ministry of Social Solidarity <u>Support:</u> F-FDTL/PNTL/Ombudsman for Human Rights in Timor-Leste/UNDP/USAID/UNMI T SSSU/FONG TIL	Hamutuk Hari'l Futuru (National Recovery Strategy): Development of a National Recovery Strategy, which focuses primarily on IDPs. The principal pillar of the programme is security, while others include housing and gender. Government-led initiative in conjunction with agencies and iNGOs. Coordinated by Ministry of Social Solidarity	Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)		Imminent (Check)	2008	
<u>Advisors</u>						
RDTL	GNR advisor to SSS	SSS		Ongoing		
I.O.M.	Immigration Unit Advisors: Tasks include development of new immigration unit	SSS		Ongoing		

RDTL	Legal Advisor: Chairs NSP working policy group.	SSS		Ongoing		
RDTL	Security Advisor	SSS		Ongoing		
RDTL	Disaster Response Advisor	SSS		Ongoing		

F-FDTL

Partner Country/ Institution	Activity Description	Beneficiary	Cost (US\$ unless stated)	Status	Start Date	End Date
<u>Infrastructure</u>						
P.R.China	Construction of new F-FDTL Head-Quarters/Construction of 100 married living quarters in Metinaro	F-FDTL	\$5-7 million	Ongoing	Feb-08	Feb-10

<u>Equipment</u>						
Malaysia	Provision of 34 Hicom Trucks	F-FDTL	\$2 million	Completed	2003	2003
Portugal	Maritime Defence Capability: Provision of two brown water navy boats. Included maintenance and training. Are now national assets. Funds remain for training only.	F-FDTL maritime component	\$3.7 million	Completed	2007	2007
P.R.China	2 Brown Water Patrol Boats	F-FDTL	\$30 million	Ongoing	2008	2009
Australia	Pacific Patrol Boat Programme: Provision of a boat for entry into Pacific Class Patrol Boat programme. First Blue water equipment Timor-Leste will possess. Will include fisheries protection, maritime surveillance etc.	F-FDTL/PNT L maritime personnel		Imminent	Mid-08	Unknown
<u>Capacity Building</u>						

Malaysia	Malaysian Defence Cooperation Programme: Military and civilian courses in Malaysia. <i>How many people a year, in what area, on what level for how long?</i>	F-FDTL		Ongoing	2001	N/A
US	Logistics Training	F-FDTL	Initially \$1 million/ year, now less	Ongoing	2002	N/A
Singapore	English language Teaching	F-FDTL		Completed	2004	2004
US/Australia	English Language Laboratory: Learning resources provided by the US, teaching provided by DCP (Australia).	F-FDTL		Ongoing	2005	N/A
Portugal	Maritime Defence Training: Hera naval base, 25 personnel.	F-FDTL maritime component		Ongoing	2006	2009
Brazil	Training of Military Police: In Brazil, 20 participants.	F-FDTL		Completed	2007 (6 Months)	
Singapore	Engineering & Medical Training: Training for military and civilian staff Military Financial Management Training <i>Where, how many, duration?</i>	F-FDTL		Completed	2007	
P.R.China	Training of Brown Water Patrol Boat Crew: To take place in China, 20 personnel at a time, in three month slots.	F-FDTL	\$30 million	Ongoing	2008	2009

Indonesia	Maritime training of F-FDTL at Naval staff college: Training at Surabaya, 6 personnel per year in 6 month time slots.	F-FDTL/PNT L		Imminent	2008	2012
ISF (Australia/ New Zealand)	Upgrade of F-FDTL Engineering capability: When the next rotation is due around Autumn 2008 New Zealand will provide solely engineering personnel that will engage with their Timorese counterparts to improve their skill set	F-FDTL engineers		Imminent	2008	Unknown
Indonesia	Military Training of F-FDTL at Army staff college: In Jakarta, 6 personnel per year, in 6 month time slots.	F-FDTL		Imminent	2008	Unknown
Australia	Training of Pacific Patrol Boat Crew: Training of crew to man boat. Training to take place at Australian Maritime College in Tasmania. 3 months in duration, 9 personnel per year. Both Sailors and officers.	F-FDTL/PNT L maritime personnel		Imminent	Mid-08	Unknown
Portugal	Agreement concerning Technical Assistance: Assistance to Military Training Centre in Metinaro and Naval Component in Hera. Includes	F-FDTL		Ongoing	2008	2009

	promotion and rank courses and basic training courses, both lasting 4 weeks each. Maritime training includes ship board instructions and navigation.					
Secretary of State for Defence (SSD)	Development of civil-military operations capacity: Cooperation capacity to be increased with PNTL and civilians in disasters. Includes development of procedures and a plan for implementation.	F-FDTL		Planning	2008	Undecided
SSD	Armouries in Baucau and Hera-Metinaro: Creation of armouries, with training and upgrade of registry.	F-FDTL		Planning	2008	Undecided
Australia	Peacekeeping Training: 150 soldiers in three batches trained to be able to undertake International Operations; rotation will allow process to be ongoing. Training to take place in Darwin	F-FDTL platoons		Pending	Jan-09 (Provisional)	2015 (Provisional)
Skills Assistance						
US	Personnel: 6 advisors for F-FDTL. Maintenance experts and Doctors	F-FDTL		Ongoing	2002	N/A
Legal Assistance						
UK	Legal Workshops: 4 legal experts from the British Military gave workshops on International Human Rights Law, armed conflicts and	F-FDTL		Completed	2001	2003

International
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Secretary of State for Defence

Partner Country/Institution	Project Description	Beneficiary	Cost (US\$ unless stated)	Status	Start Date	End Date
<u>Infrastructure</u>						
P. R. China	Construction of new building to house Ministry of Defence	Ministry of Defence (MoD)		Ongoing	Feb-08	Expected Feb-10
<u>Policy</u>						
Principal: MoD/F-FDTL Support: Australia/New Zealand/Portugal/China	Force 2020: A policy document currently without approval of Government or legislature. Top tier of Government Structure briefed on document on 8th December 2007 and is waiting for approval on the agenda for the Council of Ministers.	Security Sector, with explicit relevance to F-FDTL	Sum of its component parts	Some elements in implementation stage. Approval for document pending	Jan-07	2020

<u>Capacity Building</u>						
<u>Implementing Body:</u> UN <u>Principal Support:</u> US <u>Bilateral Support:</u> Australia/New Zealand/Malaysia/Thailand/UK/Portugal	Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD): 12 advisors positioned to develop the defence forces. This was carried out in finance, management, strategy and other areas	Ministry of Defence/F-FDTL		No longer in existence	2001	2003
Australia	Defence Budget Management: Financial management training.	MoD		Ongoing	?	?
Australia	Strategic Planning	SSD		Ongoing	?	?
Australia	Executive Secretary	SSD		Ongoing	?	?
Portugal/RDTL?	2 Legal Advisors	SSD		Ongoing	?	?
SSD	Review and Upgrading of legislative framework: Military Pension Law/Military Police Law	F-FDTL		Planning	2008	Unknown
MoD	Creation of Inspection Office: Office to provide technical support and control for Defence activities	MoD/F-FDTL		Planning	Possibly 2008	Unknown

	Creation of further core Directorates: These are planned to include for Human Resources and Patrimony Management. Will ensure military activity is carried out under the rule of law.	MoD		Planning	Possibly 2008	Unknown
MoD	Establishment of a National Security Policy (NSP): Defining external policy and threats, and based on this creating a National Defence Law, to regulate implementation of the country's defence.	MoD/F-FDTL		Planning	Possibly 2008	Unknown

Committee B

Partner Country/Institution	Activity Description	Beneficiary	Cost (US\$ unless stated)	Status	Start Date	End Date
F-FDTL	Briefing: Briefing on Force 2020 document	Commission B/Parliament		Completed	2008	

(Source: The Author)

APPENDIX H: Pictures



Above: An *Uma Lulik* or Sacred House, central to the socio-cosmic order of East Timorese society
(Source: Pandolfo, 2007)

Below: An IDP camp in Dili situated opposite UNMIT headquarters in the area designated as a UN car park. Proximity to the UN acts as a safeguard against threats of violence and ensure assistance during flooding (Source: The Author)



Below: Rebel leader Gastao Salsinha surrendering and handing over his weapon (Source: UNMIT, 2008)



Glossary

Aldeia:	A hamlet
Chefe d'Aldeia:	Head of a hamlet
Chefe de Suco:	Head of a village
Hamutuk Hari'I Futuru:	The National Recovery Strategy
Hamutuk Hari'I Estabilidade:	'Security' pillar of National Recovery Strategy
'Lean Season':	The period between November and March during which food insecurity rises
Lian Nain:	An elder with responsibility for the spiritual sphere
Liurai:	A king invested with spiritual authority to be involved in the political sphere
Suco:	A village
Uma Lulik:	The sacred house central to East Timorese kinship units. Empty space is considered spiritual concept, contains laws, prohibitions and regulates respect. Also houses sacred objects

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